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REHABILITATION, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS-STRIKING A
NEW BALANCE:
BRISCOE v. READER'S DIGEST ASSOCIATION'
A cause of action for invasion of privacy has been recognized in Cali-
fornia since 1931.2 Nevertheless, the prima facie case for this action
has consistently eluded judicial delineation. In Briscoe v. Reader's Di-
gest Association3 the California Supreme Court recently shed some light
on this problem. The Briscoe court determined that a former crimi-
nal, who alleged that the defendant's publication had unnecessarily
identified him by name in disclosing truthful but embarrassing facts
about his criminal past, had stated a cause of action for invasion of his
privacy.4 In its discussion, however, the court ignored many of the
heretofore well-recognized limitations on the right to privacy and thus
augured a radical expansion in this already burgeoining tort remedy.
The factual basis for the Briscoe case arose in January, 1968, when
Reader's Digest published an article entitled "The Big Business of Hi-
1. 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971).
2. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931). In Melvin, a reformed
prostitute who had been notoriously tried and acquitted for murder seven years earlier,
brought suit for invasion of privacy against the defendants who exhibited a motion
picture ('The Red Kimono") based on true facts of her past life. In advertising the
movie the defendants identified the principal character of the story as Gabrielle Dar-
ley (plaintiffs maiden name). After marriage the plaintiff assumed an anonymous
and respectable place in the community and had made many friends who were not
aware of her past activities. In affirming her right to recover damages for invasion
of privacy, the court stated:
[Plublication by respondents of the unsavory incidents in the past life of appel-
lant after she had reformed, coupled with her true name, was not justified by any
standard of morals or ethics known to us and was a direct invasion of her inalien-
able right guaranteed to her by our [California] Constitution, to pursue and ob-
tain happiness. Id. at 292, 297 P. at 93 (emphasis added).
Although the Melvin court recognized the existence of the "right to privacy" cause of
action in other jurisdictions it refused to denominate the relief it granted to the plain-
tiff by that name. Instead the court preferred to hold that the plaintiff stated a
cause of action under California Constitution article I, section 1:
Whether we call this a right of privacy or give it any other name is immaterial
because it is a right guaranteed by our Constitution that must not be ruthlessly and
needlessly invaded by others. 112 Cal. App. at 292, 297 P. at 93-94.
3. 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971).
4. Id. at 543, 483 P.2d at 44, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 876. See Complaint for Damages
No. 944396, Superior Court of the State of California, Los Angeles County, Dec. 10,
1968, counts V, VIII, X, at 2, 3. [hereinafter cited as Complaint No. 944396).
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jacking."5  The five-page article detailed many incidents of truck hi-
jackings throughout the United States. It also reported FBI and local
police statistics about hijacking arrests for several years preceding 1968
and outlined preventive programs established by the trucking industry
and law enforcement agencies. Dates ranging from 1964 to the time
of publication were mentioned throughout the article but none of the
thefts noted were themselves dated. As an example of one of ihe "typi-
cal" hijackings, one sentence in the article described an unsuccessful
and rather ludicrous hijacking attempt and specifically identified Mar-
vin Briscoe as one of the hijackers. 6 There was no express indication
in the article that the hijacking had occurred in 1956, more than eleven
years earlier .
Briscoe filed a complaint against Reader's Digest Association, Inc. in
the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. He alleged that immedi-
ately following the reported criminal incident he had abandoned his
life of shame and had become entirely rehabilitated, thereafter living an
exemplary, virtuous and honorable life and assuming a position in re-
spectable society." As a result of the article, Briscoe claimed, his
friends and 11-year-old daughter had learned for the first time of the
unsavory incidents of his criminal past.9 He was allegedly scorned and
abandoned by them thereafter.'"
Briscoe conceded that the subject of the article may have been news-
worthy, but asserted that the use of his name was not." He further
alleged that the use of his name was for the purpose of incurring gains
and profits, and that such use willfully and maliciously destroyed his
privacy, annoyed and disgraced him, and exposed him to contempt
5. The Big Business of Hijacking, RE.ADE's DIOEm, JAN. 1968, at 115 [hereinafter
cited as Big Business]. This article was a condensed version of an article written by
Bill Surface and originally published by the Chicago American Publishing Company
in the December 10, 1967 issue of Chicago's- American Magazine. The defendant,
Reader's Digest, conceded that the prior Chicago publication of the article did not ab-
solve it from liability. 4 Cal. 3d at 533 n.1, 483 P.2d at 36 n.1, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 868
n.1.
6. The article stated:
Typical of many beginners, Marvin Briscoe and Garland Russell stole a "valuable-
looking" truck in Danville, Ky., and then fought a gun battle with the local
police, only to learn that they had hijacked four bowling-pin spotters. Big Busi-
ness, supra note 5, at 118.
7. 4 Cal. 3d at 533, 483 P.2d at 36, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
8. Complaint No. 944396, supra note 4, count VI, at 2.
9. Complaint No. 944396, supra note 4, count XI, at 3.
10. Id.
11. 4 Cal. 3d at 533, 483 P.2d at 36, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 868,
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and ridicule. 2 The above allegations, Briscoe asserted, were sufficient
to state a cause of action for damages for invasion of his privacy.
Briscoe also contended that, since the offense had occurred some
twelve years before the disclosure and since he had subsequently assumed
a place in respectable society, the defendant's failure to insert the date
of the hijacking in its article would cause a reader to infer that the
crime was of recent vintage, thereby placing the plaintiff in a false light
before the public eye. 13  Briscoe claimed that as a direct and prox-
imate result of the publication he had been generally damaged in the
sum of $100,000 and demanded exemplary damages in the sum of
$1,000,000.14
Reader's Digest filed a demurrer which was sustained by the trial
court without leave to amend the complaint.'" Briscoe appealed the
judgment of dismissal thereafter entered (without opinion) to the Cali-
fornia court of appeal, contending that he had stated facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action for invasion of his privacy, and, in the
alternative, that the trial court should have granted him leave to amend
the complaint. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court judg-
ment' and Briscoe then appealed to the California Supreme Court. In
a unanimous decision written by Justice Peters, the supreme court re-
versed the trial court's judgment and held that Briscoe's complaint
stated a cause of action for invasion of privacy.'
7
12. Complaint No. 944396, supra note 4, count X, at 3.
13. The plaintiff attempted to factually support this contention by referring to two
sentences appearing above the title on the first page of the article: "Today's highway-
men are looting trucks at a rate of more than $100 million a year. But the truckers
have now declared all-out war." Big Business, supra note 5, at 115 (emphasis added).
The plaintiff contended that a reasonable reader would interpret the words "today"
and "now" and the numerous recent dates mentioned in the article as implying recent
or current events, and thus import this recentness to the non-dated hijacking committed
by the plaintiff. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Demurrer, No. 944396, Superior Court of the State of California, Los Angeles County,
April 2, 1969.
14. Complaint No. 944396, supra note 4, count XIII, at 3.
15. 4 Cal. 3d at 532, 483 P.2d at 36, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
16. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Civ. No. 35307 (Calif. court of appeal, filed
Aug. 26, 1970, certified for nonpublication). In affirming the trial court, the court of
appeal stated:
It thus appears that the article referred to the theft of a truck which was a matter
of public record; and the subject of the article (hijacking of trucks) was news-
worthy and was of interest to the public. It was not alleged that the facts reported
in the article were untrue. The complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action for damages for invasion of privacy. The court did not err in
sustaining the demurrer. Id. at 9-10 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
17. The defendant demurred both specially and generally to the plaintiff's complaint.
Contrary to California Code of Civil Procedure § 472d, the trial court sustained de-
fendant's demurrer in general terms, without including a statement of the specific
NOTES
Justice Peters initially recognized the importance of the competing
interests involved and the necessity of balancing those interests to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff had stated a cause of action. Since in the
privacy area the plaintiff's interest (right to privacy) and the defend-
ant's interest (freedom of the press) seem virtually irreconcilable, the
balance must be finely drawn. Justice Peters proceeded to carefully
analyze and delineate these broad interests in order to discern exactly
what needed protection and why. Two fundamental interests were
thought to support Briscoe's right to recover damages for invasion of
his privacy: (1) the obvious right to privacy itself, and (2) the not so
obvious societal interest in the rehabilitation of former criminals."8
With respect to Reader's Digest, the court narrowed the asserted interest
in a free press to a consideration of the defendant's right to identify by
name a former criminal when reporting the content of his past crime."
After finding that the plaintiff had not voluntarily consented to the
publicity accorded him,20 the Briscoe court weighed the conflicting in-
terests involved and found that the right of the press in this instance
was a qualified right, protected only if the matter complained of was
newsworthy and did not reveal facts so offensive as to shock the com-
munity's notions of decency.21 Substantially modifying the criteria set
forth in one of its recent decisions to define newsworthiness, 22 the court
concluded that a jury could reasonably find that disclosure of Briscoe's
criminal identity was not newsworthy 23 (even though his name and
criminal status are matters of public record) and that revealing a per-
son's criminal past for all to see is grossly offensive to most people in
this country. 24 The prima facie case for this cause of action was ap-
parently held to be a public disclosure of private facts made with reck-
less disregard for its offensiveness, which disclosure would be highly
offensive to a reasonable man in the plaintiff's situation.2 5  The rele-
vant factors to be considered by the trier of fact would be:
grounds therefor. (The record does not reveal a waiver of the requirements of
§ 472d). The Briscoe court assumed that the trial court ruled only on the general
demurrer and, in reversing the judgment and remanding the case, directed the trial
court "to rule upon the points presented by the special demurrer." 4 Cal. 3d at 544,
483 P.2d at 44, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
18. 4 Cal. 3d at 538-39, 483 P.2d at 40-41, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73.
19. Id. at 537, 483 P.2d at 40, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
20. Id. at 542, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
21. Id. at 541, 483 P.2d at 42-43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 874-75.
22. Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 459 P.2d 912, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1969) (for
discussion see text accompanying notes 148-68 infra).
23. 4 Cal. 3d at 541, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
24. Id. at 542, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
25. See text accompanying notes 169-230 infra.
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(1) whether plaintiff had become a rehabilitated member of society,
(2) whether identifying him as a former criminal would be highly of-
fensive and injurious to the reasonable man, (3) whether defendant
published this information with a reckless disregard for its offensive-
ness, and (4) whether any independent justification for printing plain-
tiff's identity existed. 26
New law was established not only with the Briscoe court's resolution
of the issue relating to the plaintiffs cause of action for invasion of
privacy, but also with regard to the plaintiff's contention that he had
alleged a "false light" cause of action. The court viewed the latter as
substantially equivalent to a libel claim and hence felt that Briscoe
should comply with the California retraction provision, section 48a of
the Civil Code.2 7 This section provides as a prerequisite to the recov-
ery of general damages that a defendant must fail to retract the alleg-
edly defamatory article after a formal request to do so has been made
by the plaintiff.2 8 However, in Morris v. National Federation of the
Blind, 9 the court held that section 48a applies only to publications in
newspapers or by radio broadcast, but not to magazines.8 0 Neverthe-
less, and without explanation, the Briscoe court extended the operation
of section 48a to allegedly libelous magazine publications.
In reaching its decision, the Briscoe court engaged in a rambling
analysis which fails to disclose a convincing or even a logical rationale.
The opinion not only ignored established principles adverse to the re-
sults reached, but also neglected to consider the extent of the burden
imposed -upon the press. Nevertheless, the case is probably the most
significant privacy decision in forty years, since it squarely confronts
the constitutional considerations currently threatening to engulf portions
of the law of privacy. Through a critical analysis of each facet of the
opinion, the outlines of a new approach to fulfilling the growing thirst
for individual privacy may be perceived.
I. TRuTHFuL DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE MATTERS
A. The Right to Privacy3 1
Appropriately, the Briscoe court began its discussion by turning to
the landmark law review article which many feel gave birth to the legal
26. 4 Cal. 3d at 543, 483 P.2d at 44, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
27. Id. at 543, 483 P.2d at 44, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
28. CAL,. Civ. CODE § 48a (West 1970).
29. 192 Cal. App. 2d 162, 13 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1961).
30. Id. at 166, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 338; accord, In re Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.
N.Y. 1964).
31. For a concise but thorough discussion of the origins of the right to privacy in
[Vol. 5
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theory of a right to privacy.3 2  The authors of that article, Samuel D.
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, considered the right to privacy to be
the individual's "fight of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his
this country, see W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 802-04 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PnossER].
32. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890) [here-
inafter cited as Warren & Brandeis]. Therein the authors stated:
That the individual shall have full protection in person and in property is a prin-
ciple as old as the common law; but it has been found necessary from time to
time to define anew the exact nature and extent of such protection. Political,
social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common
law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society. . .. [A]nd now
the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life,-the right to be let
alone. . . . Id. (emphasis added).
Judge Cooley had first coined the phrase "the right to be let alone" some two years
earlier. See T. COOLEY, TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
Historically, there has been a notable lack of "privacy" case law from the United
States Supreme Court. This can be attributed to the fact that the "power basis" for en-
forcement of the right gained recogniiion and momentum exclusively in the common
law. Only recently has a portion of the right been traced to the Federal Constitution.
In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the right to privacy against govern-
mental invasions was elevated in status to that of a constitutional guarantee. Although
four Justices were in agreement as to the importance of the right there were two distinct
views as to its primary constitutional source. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing the opinion
for the Court, held that a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives vio-
lated the appellant's constitutional right to marital privacy. In Justice Douglas'
opinion prior Supreme Court cases suggested that "specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance." id. at 484. Under this penumbra theory, various consti-
tutional guarantees-the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments-create
zones of privacy. Id.
While Justice Douglas relied primarily on his "penumbra theory" as the basis for
the right to marital privacy, Justice Goldberg, with whom Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Brennan joined, wrote a concurring opinion expressing the belief that the source
of the right to marital privacy is to be found in the "language and history of the
Ninth Amendment. . . ." Id. at 487. Presumably, all of those protected rights found
in the "penumbra" of specific guarantees by Justice Douglas would similarly receive
like protection within the confines of the Ninth Amendment. To Justice Goldberg,
the mere existence of the Ninth Amendment "shows a belief of the Constitution's
authors that fundamental rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first
eight amendments and an intent that the lists of rights included there not be deemed
exhaustive." Id. at 492.
The necessary majority for reversal in Griswold was obtained by the concurring
opinion of Justice Harlan who rejected any approach to the problem other than a
Fourteenth Amendment due process approach. Justice Harlan felt that the Connecti-
cut statute infringed the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
it violated the "basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' . . ." Id.
at 500, quoting from Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
Recently, in Nader v. General Motors Corp., 57 Misc. 2d 301, 292 N.Y.S.2d 514
(Sup. Ct. 1968), affd on other grounds 31 App. Div. 2d 392, 298 N.Y.S.2d 137
(1969), alf'd 25 N.Y.2d 560, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647, 255 N.E.2d 765 (1970), a New York
trial court, in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss various causes of action, rec-
ognized that "there is presented a constitutional right of plaintiff to privacy-a right to
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thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others." 8
The article further suggested that the design and scope of the law of
privacy should be
to protect those persons with whose affairs the community has no legit-
imate concern, from being dragged into an undesirable and undesired
publicity and to protect all persons, whatsoever their position or station,
from having matters which they may properly prefer to keep private,
made public against their will. It is the unwarranted invasion of in-
dividual privacy which is reprehended, and to be, so far as possible,
protected.8
4
The right to recover for invasions of privacy gained gradual accept-
ance among the states 5 and made its California debut in Melvin v.
Reid. 6 Although there was no existing statutory authority specifically
providing for a right to privacy, the court in Melvin found that the Cali-
fornia Constitution contained provisions37 which recognized the right
be left alone. The right of privacy stands on high ground, cognate to the values and
concerns protected by constitutional guarantees (See: 4th, 5th, and 14th Amendments,
Fed. Const. . .. )." 292 N.Y.S.2d at 518. There, the constitutional source of the
right was interpreted to permit an extension of liability beyond that permitted by
the New York privacy statute. See PROSSER, supra note 31, at 816. Due to the ap-
parent lack of state action, an issue which the court failed to discuss, the decision is
questionable. See, e.g., Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970). As to the possibility of
a California constitutional source for the right to privacy, see note 37 infra.
33. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 32, at 198. Variations on this definition of pri-
vacy are numerous. In Westin, Science, Privacy and Freedom: Issues and Proposals
for the 1970's, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1003 (1966), privacy is defined as the right to define
one's circle of intimacy, to choose who shall see beneath the quotidian mask. Id.
at 1023. In a sociological rather than a strictly legal context, privacy is viewed as a
"zero-relationship between two persons or two groups or between a group and a per-
son. . . in the sense that it is constituted by the absence of interaction or communica-
tion or perception within contexts in which such interaction .. . is practicable ..
Shills, Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 ]LAw & CONTEMP. PR6B. 280,
281 (1966). An invasion of privacy is to be distinguished from defamation in that
the former is not an injury "to the character or reputation, but a direct wrong of a
personal character resulting in injury to the feelings without regard to any effect which
the publication may have on the property, business, pecuniary interest, or the standing
of the individual in the community." Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equipment Co.,
138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 86, 291 P.2d 194, 197 (1955).
34. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 32, at 214-15. Initially the authors had a diffi-
cult time tracing the right to the common law. 4 Cal. 3d at 533, 483 P.2d at 36, 93
Cal. Rptr. at 868.
35. As of 1971, this right had been expressly rejected in only Rhode Island, Ne-
braska, Texas and Wisconsin. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 804.
36. 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P.91 (1931) (discussed in note 2 supra).
37. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 1 provides:
All men are by nature free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights,
among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, pos-
sessing, and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.
NOTES
to pursue and obtain safety and happiness without improper infringe-
ment by others.38
The inevitable clash between the right to privacy and the right to
disseminate information to the public was recognized by Warren and
Brandeis. They suggested the right to privacy should be inapplicable
in matters of "public or general interest."3 9 California cases subsequent
to Melvin recognized this limitation and restricted the interest protected
to the right to be free from unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful
publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual which
are outside the realm of legitimate public concern. 40  It was accepted
in most jurisdictions that a cause of action for violation of the right to
privacy would not lie for publication of legitimate newsworthy items.41
This defense of newsworthiness, sometimes called a privilege,4" was
considered a question of law within the exclusive province of the
judge. 43  Due to the availability of the defense of newsworthiness, re-
covery was not for the mere invasion of one's privacy, "but for an 'un-
reasonable' or 'unwarranted' invasion."44 Presumably, if the disclosure
was of newsworthy matter, then it would not be an unwarranted inva-
sion of privacy.45 Included within this defense of newsworthiness was
the publication of matters contained in truly public records.46 A
truthful disclosure of facts contained in such records has been consid-
38. 112 Cal. App. at 291, 297 P. at 93.- Also see CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 9 (free
speech and press) & 23 (rights reserved by the people) for other possible sources of the
right to privacy.
39. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 32, at 214.
40. See, e.g., Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. 2d 315, 239 P.2d 876 (1952).
41. E.g., Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1958); Wade,
Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 V. mn. L. REv. 1093, 1113 (1962) [herein-
after cited as Wade].
42. E.g., Samuel v. Curtis Publishing Co., 122 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
43. See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 711 (1940).
There is practically no discussion of why [the existence of a legitimate public in-
terest] is treated as a matter of law, but it is obvious that the reason is that there
are here involved important matters of freedom of speech and of the press; and
the courts are not ready to delegate the delicate weighing process here to the jury.
Wade, supra note 41, at 1116.
44. Wade, supra note 41, at 1114.
45. Id. at 1121 n.156.
46. There are three categories of records in the area of law enforcement: (1)
'The 'raw' investigation files of police agencies"; (2) "the routine records that are the
daily grist for the paper mill that characterizes big-city law enforcement agencies:
fingerprints, photos, arrest and conviction records"; and (3) "the court records in
criminal cases." Karst, "The Files": Legal Controls Over The Accuracy and Acces-
sibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAw & CONT-MP. PROB. 342, 365 (1966) [herein-
after cited as Karst]. In criminal cases, only the court records are truly public records.
id. Hence, in this Note, every reference to "public records" will relate to the records
1972]
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ered a disclosure of public rather than private facts, therefore making
the disclosure privileged.4 7  As was stated in Gill v. Hearst Publishing
Co.,4s "the 'general object in view is to protect the privacy of private
life, and to whatever degree and in whatever connection a man's life
has ceased to be private, before the publication under consideration
has been made, to that extent the protection is to be withdrawn.' "40
In Briscoe, neither the existence of the tort nor the definition of the
basic interest to be protected was at issue.50 The issue of the general
applicability of the tort to former criminals was quickly disposed of by
Justice Peters who felt it axiomatic that the past criminal possesses a
right of privacy the same as every other citizen. Thus, the major issues
confronting the court were: (1) the newsworthiness of the disclosure of
Briscoe's identity, which necessarily brings into question the applicabil-
ity of the once well-recognized public record defense, and (2) the de-
termination of the prima facie elements of the tort in the absence of
any statutory or definitive decisional law on the subject.5 The second
of criminal court proceedings "freely available for inspection" by any citizen. See id.
at 347 & n.23.
47. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 810-11.
48. 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953).
49. Id. at 228-29, 253 P.2d at 443, quoting Warren & Brandeis, supra note 32, at
215. The Gill court also stated that "the right of privacy is determined by the norm
of the ordinary man .. " 40 Cal. 2d at 229, 253 P.2d at 444.
50. In Briscoe, the interest in the right to privacy was considered an individual in-
terest. Some commentators have urged that the interests of privacy (and defamation)
should be considered societal interests,
lest we slip into an all too frequent error of unduly influencing the balancing
process. . . What we must weigh is society's interest in preserving each
individual's right to privacy and freedom from defamation against society's interest
in affording each individual full disclosure and commentary. Wright, Defamation,
Privacy and the Public's Right to Know: A National Problem and a New Approach,
46 TExAs L. Rnv. 630, 633-34 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Wright].
See Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort
Petty and Unconstitutional As Well?, 46 TExAs L. REv. 611, 620 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Bloustein]. However, the failure of the Briscoe court to consider the societal
interest in the right of privacy did not prejudice the ultimate weighing of the competing
interests since the societal interest in the rehabilitation of former criminals was con-
sidered a major interest favoring Briscoe's position. See text accompanying notes
112-27 infra. Of course, in an effective rehabilitative process, anonymity (privacy) is
a key ingredient. Consequently, insofar as the success or failure of one's rehabilitation
depends on the level of anonymity attained, society's interest in rehabilitation will in
effect be an interest in the right of privacy.
51. In addition to the absence of clear guidelines, there is the problem of the in-
herent infusion of the tort into the questionably separate tort of defamation. See gen-
erally Note, The Invasion of Defamation by Privacy, 23 STAN. L. REv. 547 (1971).
When Warren and Brandeis suggested that the right of privacy does not prohibit any
publication of matter which is of "public or general interest," they analogized the scope
of the right to that area of libel and slander law which deals with the conditional
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issue overlaps the first, since the First Amendment right to freedom of
the press52 necessarily injects the newsworthiness factor into any tort
defined in terms of publication. The protection afforded by the First
Amendment depends upon the precise nature and extent of the defend-
ant's and society's interest in the identification of Marvin Briscoe as a
former criminal. As Justice Peters so aptly stated: "The instant case
[pits] a rehabilitated felon's right to anonymity against a magazine's
right to identify him. . ."5,
B. Freedom of the Press
Justice Peters, in a prolonged critical analysis of the scope of First
Amendment protection of the press, concentrated on the "time" aspect,
i.e., the recentness of the event to be reported. He concluded first that
"the privilege [of the press] extends to almost all reporting of recent
events, even though it involves the publication of a purely private indi-
vidual's name or likeness."54  "Hot news" was deemed subject to
greater constitutional protection because public concern is necessarily
more immediate and there is a greater possibility for editorial errors
privilege of fair comment and criticism. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 32, at 214.
This analogy has caused some courts to misapply standards set forth by courts of
greater authority, and the essential distinctions between defamation and privacy have
become blurred. Note, The Invasion of Defamation by Privacy, supra, at 560. Pro-
fessor Prosser attempted to define the tort by dividing it into four separate torts under
one general right to privacy: (1) intrusion into plaintiff's physical solitude or seclu-
sion; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) placing the plaintiff in a false light
in the public eye; and (4) appropriation of plaintiff's name or likeness for defendant's
benefit or advantage. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 804-15. The areas of concern in
Briscoe are Prosser's second and third categories, disclosure and false light.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. I:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances. (emphasis added).
53. 4 Cal. 3d at 534, 483 P.2d at 37, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 869; cf. Gill v. Curtis Pub-
lishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 277-78, 239 P.2d 630, 633 (1952) and Gill v. Hearst Pub-
lishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 228, 253 P.2d 441, 443 (1953).
54. 4 Cal. 3d at 535, 483 P.2d at 38, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 870 (emphasis added). In
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S, 374, 383-84 (1967), twenty-two cases are cited wherein
the right of privacy was subordinated to the right of the press to publish matters of
public interest (a majority of them involving events which had occurred relatively re-
cently).
Truthful commentary on public officials or public affairs enjoys almost absolute
immunity regardless of the seriousness of the "invasion of privacy" as public officials
are considered to have waived the right to privacy and to have voluntarily subjected
themselves to fair comment and criticism. 4 Cal. 3d at 535-36 nn. 5 & 7, 483 P.2d at
37-38 nn. 5 & 7, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 869-70 nn. 5 & 7.
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"where deadlines must be met and quick decisions [must be] made. ' ' "
Similarly, the reporting of recent criminal activities, including the names
of the suspects or the offenders, is within the legitimate province of a
free press and hence fully protected by the First Amendment. 60
Justice Peters carefully distinguished, however, the instant case from
such "hot news" situations, noting that the publication concerning Bris-
coe "compels us to consider whether reports of the facts of past crimes
and the identification of past offenders serve .. .public-interest func-
tions."57  The court thus made a distinction, which resulted in a me-
thodic shift in sympathy, between the reporting of recent events and
the reporting of past events. But even in the latter situations, the
court had "no doubt that reports of the facts of past crimes are news-
worthy"58 and that Reader's Digest therefore had a right to report the
facts of Briscoe's criminal act.5 9 However, with respect to the identi-
fication of Briscoe as the perpetrator, the court felt that the relevant
First Amendment interests in publishing the name of the actor in a
past event were of lesser importance than those supporting publication
of the content of the past crime or the content and name of a person
accused of a recent crime."0 Justice Peters viewed the nature of the
public's interest in this type of disclosure as mere curiosity, unless the
individual had reattracted the public eye in some independent fashion,0 1
or was originally involved in an event so unique that public interest
has never wavered from him.62 In the absence of such uniqueness or
55. 4 Cal. 3d at 535, 483 P.2d at 38, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 870; accord, Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892, 895-96 (3d Cir. 1969), affd, 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
For a discussion of the Rosenbloom case see text accompanying notes 222-29 infra.
56. 4 Cal. 3d at 536, 483 P.2d at 39, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 871. Several reasons are cited
to support this observation: (1) the public need to know about the circumstances of
the crime and the criminal techniques employed in order to cope with future crime;
(2) reports may encourage unknown witnesses to come forth with useful testimony and
others to come to the aid of the victim; and (3) it will put others "on notice" of the
identity of those persons charged with a crime so that they can act accordingly. Id.
57. Id. at 537, 483 P.2d at 39, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
58. Id. (emphasis added). The court reasoned that publication of the incidents of
a past crime may prove educational (similar in benefit to reports of recent crimes)
and that the public has a strong interest in enforcing the law, i.e., accumulating and
disseminating data in an effort to discover the reasons why people commit crime, the
methods they use, and the manner in which the criminals are apprehended. Id., 483
P.2d at 39-40, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72.
59. Id., 483 P.2d at 40, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
60. Id. Such an identification would usually serve "little independent public purpose.
Once legal proceedings have terminated, and a suspect or offender has been released,
identification of the individual will not usually aid the administration of justice." Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 538, 483 P.2d at 40, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 872. The court cited the St.
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infamy, a jury could reasonably find that revelation of plaintiff's identity
as a former hijacker was of minimum social value.
63
In excluding mere curiosity from the First Amendment's protective
umbrella, the court apparently adopted Alexander Meikeljohn's theory
of the scope of that constitutional guarantee.64 Quoting Meikeljohn, the
court characterized the central purpose of the First Amendment as in-
tended "to give to every voting member of the body politic the fullest
possible participation in the understanding of those problems with
which the citizens of a self-governing society must deal .. ."5 Un-
der this theory "the point of ultimate interest is not the words of the
speakers, but the minds of the hearers."6 6 The interest protected is
not the private right to speak but rather the public right to know.
67
What is important is "not that everyone shall speak," 68 nor that there
shall be "unregulated talkativeness,"6' 9 but that "everything worth saying
shall be said."70  Although the private right to speak may be limited
or completely denied because it is "contrary to the common good,' 71 the
public right to know "admits of no exceptions.
'72
At one extreme the public right to know could include "the public's
concern or curiosity about the private affairs of private individuals.
'73
At the other, the public right to know would only include the public's
interest in the qualifications and views of political candidates and the
"considerations underlying passage or defeat of proposed legislation. ' 74
Meikeljohn adopted a middle position which includes information
within the public's right to know if the "discussion of the given subject
Valentines Day Massacre and the sinking of the Titanic as typical "unique" events.
In the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867, comment c (1939), considerations similar to
those in Briscoe are hypothesized:
[Criminals] are the objects of legitimate public interest during a period of time
after their conduct. . . has brought them to the public attention; until they have
reverted to the lawful and unexciting life led by the great bulk of the community,
they are subject to the privileges which publishers have to satisfy the curiosity
of the public as to their leaders, heroes, villains and victims.
63. 4 Cal. 3d at 541, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
64. A. MEnmLOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE (1960) [hereinafter cited as MEIKELJOHN].
65. 4 Cal. 3d at 534-35, 483 P.2d at 37, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 869, quoting MFEIKEL-
JOHN, supra note 64, at 75.
66. MEmmLoHN, supra note 64, at 26.
67. Bloustein, supra note 50, at 624.
68. Id. at 624, quoting MEIKELJOHN, supra note 64, at 26.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id., quoting MEIKELJOHN, supra note 64, at 57.
72. Id., quoting MEIKELJOHN, supra note 64, at 20.
73. Wright, supra note 50, at 632.
74. Id.
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matter contributes to the public understanding essential to self-govern-
ment. ' 5  If so, the communication of such information is absolutely
protected. "If it does not fulfill [that] purpose, the communication
may be subject to reasonable limitation in the public interest just like the
exercise of any other private right."76  Under this interpretation of the
First Amendment, it is possible that incidents might be "newsworthy,"
in the sense that the information is relevant to the purposes of self-
government, 77 while at the same time publication of the names of the
participants might not be newsworthy, since such publication might
serve only to feed the public's insatiable curiosity.78
Although Justice Peters' approach to the First Amendment follows
nicely that of Meikeljoln, there is no comparable authority in deci-
sional law which supports this thesis, and, in fact, what little case law
exists is contrary to such an approach. First of all, case law seems
to support the conclusion that "whatever is in the news media is by
definition newsworthy, that the press must in the nature of things be
the final arbiter of newsworthiness. '79 There is criticism of this point,
aimed not at the correctness of the conclusion, but rather at the pro-
priety of the decisions supporting it.80 Some of the decisions are em-
phatic in their refusal to distinguish "news for information and news for
entertainment." '  In others,82 the result impels the conclusion that
75. Bloustein, supra note 50, at 625.
76. Id.
The guarantee given by the First Amendment is not, then, assured to all speaking.
It is assured only to speech which bears, directly or indirectly, upon issues with
which voters have to deal-only, therefore, to the consideration of matters of public
interest. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 64, at 79.
77. See Bloustein, supra note 50, at 625.
78. Id. at 626. Professor Bloustein views the decision in New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), as a proper application of the Meikeljohn theory.
Bloustein, supra note 50, at 624. However, in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967),
Professor Bloustein felt that the Court "failed to distinguish the issue of the relevance
[to the people's right to self-govermnent] of the use of the family name, from the issue
of the relevance of information concerning the opening of the play." Bloustein, supra
note 50, at 626. See also Nimmer, The Right to Speak From Times to Time: First
Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. Rnv.
935, 966-67 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Nimmer], where the author suggests that the
name of the actor may be separated from the event, and publication of the former may
not be considered constitutionally protected while the latter is within the public's
legitimate right to know.
79. Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 326, 336 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Kalven]: "The cases admittedly
do not go quite this far, but they go far enough to decimate the tort." Id.
80. E.g., Bloustein, supra note 50, at 626.
81. Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
357 U.S. 921 (1958) (an accurate one-page account with 150 words and several photo-
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"ftlo a very great extent the press .. .has succeeded in making its
own definition of news, as a glance at any morning newspaper will suf-
ficiently indicate. '183  These decisions are not inconsistent with the
Meikeljoln theory because they defer to the media in determining
whether the communication involved is news."4 Rather, the incon-
sistency lies in their failure to distinguish between news which is neces-
sary to further the purposes of a self-governing people and that which
does nothing more than satisfy the people's curiosity. Their failure to
make this distinction results in the inability to afford each a different
constitutional standard of protection, i.e., to subject the latter category
of news to reasonable restrictions while absolutely protecting the for-
mer. Instead both are grouped together as simply being newsworthy
and afforded almost complete protection in the name of the First
Amendment.
The unwillingness of most prior privacy decisions to follow the Mei-
keljohn theory and divide news into two categories probably explains
graphs republishing, one year after the event, the story of how the plaintiff's decedent
had been kicked to death by a teen-age gang was held to be a matter of public interest).
The United States Supreme Court expressed a similar view in Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 375, 388 (1967):
We have no doubt that the subject of the Life article, the opening of a new play
linked to an actual incident, is a matter of public interest. "The line between the
informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of ... [freedom
of the press]." Id., quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
82. See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 .F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert.-denied,
311 U.S. 711 (1940). The admitted curiosity about the plaintiff, a former child prodigy
whose present life was disclosed without his consent, was still considered "of public
concern" even though the plaintiff had intentionally "cloaked himself in obscurity"
for over twenty-five years. Id. at 809.
83. Note, The Invasion of Defamation by Privacy, 23. STAN. L. REV. 547, 556
(1971), quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 846 (3d ed. 1964).
But see Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474 (1964) (pic-
ture showing plaintiff with her dress blown up by air jets in a fun house at a county
fair held not to have legitimate news value, since, inter alia, there was nothing in the
photograph which the public had a right to know); Trammell v. Citizens News Co.,
285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d 708 (1941) (malicious notice published in newspaper stating
that plaintiff owed one of the defendants money on a grocery account held not a
matter of legitimate public interest).
84. "'News' includes all events and items of information which are out of the ordi-
nary humdrum routine, and which have 'that indefinable quality of [interest] which
arouses public attention.'" W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 845-46
(3d ed. 1964), quoting Sweenek v. Pathe News, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 746, 747 (E.D.N.Y.
1936). Interestingly, in Leavy v. Cooney, 214 Cal. App. 2d 496, 29 Cal. Rptr. 580
(1963), the court rejected the defendant's contention that a motion picture based on a
widely publicized criminal case was protected on the ground that the matter was al-
ready within the public domain. Since the occurrances depicted followed a script and
took place for the first time before a motion-picture camera, the court held that the
picture was not in any sense the dissemination of news,
19721
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their similarly consistent failure to sever the identification of the actor
from the event disclosed."5 In Melvin v. Reid, 6 however, the Cali-
fornia court did hold that the identification of the plaintiff in connec-
tion with the exhibition of a motion picture about her past life was not
newsworthy, even though the actual facts of her past life were deemed
newsworthy since they were matters of public record. Although the
decision is not clear as to whether it was the use of her maiden name
(Gabriel Darley) or the disclosure of her present identity (Mrs. Mel-
vin) which upset the court, 7 the complaint in the case clearly indicates
that only her maiden name was disclosed."" The court's severance of
her name from her prior conduct was accomplished without any appar-
ent recognition of the fact that both were matters of public record.
Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the Briscoe decision is Justice
Peters' conclusion that the disclosure of Briscoe's name in connection
with his past crime, all a matter of public record, was of minimal social
value. Precedent indicates that, as a matter of law, such information is
public rather than private and therefore publication of it should be ab-
solutely protected."9 The contrary inference in Briscoe is that a non-
85. "Nothing so exclusively belongs to a man or is so personal and valuable to him
as his name. His reputation and the character he has built up are inseparably connected
with it." Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 90,
291 P.2d 194, 199 (1955), citing State ex rel. LaFollette v. Hinkle, 131 Wash. 86,
89, 229 P. 317, 319 (1924). If a man's name is so inseparably connected to the "per-
son' of that man, an incident of his very being, it seems highly fictional and far
from reality to separate the two when that person becomes involved in a criminal act,
and the incidents of the crime, including as an integral part thereof the identification
of the actor, are spread upon the public record. Society does not erase the man's
name wherever it appears in the public record after some sufficient period of time
has elapsed from the date of the crime.
86. 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
87. Id. at 291, 297 P. at 93; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 836
n.92 (3d ed. 1964).
88. Plaintiff's Complaint, Melvin v. Reid, Civil No. 254102 (L.A. Super. Ct., filed
June 8, 1928).
89. "inhere can be no privacy with respect to a matter which is already public,
ordinarily matters embodied in public records are not within the scope of [right of
privacy] protection." Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 117, 14
Cal. Rptr. 208, 212 (1961) (defendant published an article about public events in which
the plaintiff played a part some 30 years earlier).
Prior to Briscoe it Was well-establisfied that:
The facts disclosed to the public must be private facts, and not public ones. The
plaintiff cannot complain when an occupation in which he publicly engages is called
to public attention, or when publicity is given to matters such as the date of his
birth or marriage, or his military service record, which are a matter of public
record, and open to public inspection .... The contention that when an in-
dividual is thus singled out from the public scene and undue attention is focused
upon him, there is an invasion of his private rights, has not been borne out by the
decisions. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 810-11 (footnotes omitted).
NOTES
infamous criminal can revert to the privacy of every day life merely by
an unspecified uneventful lapse of time. Thus, the lapse of time be-
tween the commission of the crime and its subsequent redisclosure is a
dominant factor in diminishing the protectability of the publication un-
der the First Amendment. In Briscoe the eleven year and one month
time span between the crime and the publication of the article was suffi-
ciently long to raise serious doubt about the degree of public interest
(other than mere curiosity) in Briscoe's identity as a former criminal,
even when used in connection with a truthful report of the facts of his
crime.
The clear weight of authority prior to Briscoe was that, once a per-
son's activities become a matter of public interest, he could not revert
to a private status merely by lapse of time, or that, under the circum-
stances, the period of time was insufficient to deprive the defendant of
the privilege to publish newsworthy material:90
One troublesome question, upon which none of the cases dealing
with the Constitutional privilege has yet touched, is that of the effect of
lapse of time, during which the plaintiff has returned to obscurity ...
If it is only the event which is recalled, without the use of the plain-
tiff's name, there seems to be no doubt that even a great lapse of time
does not destroy the privilege [freedom of the press]. Most of the
common law decisions have held that even the addition of his name
and likeness is not enough to lead to liability. There are, however,
two or three decisions indicating that a point may be reached at
which a past event is no longer news, and the unnecessary mention
of the plaintiff's name in connection with it may afford a cause of ac-
tion. 91
If it is assumed that the fact disclosed is a matter of public record, then
precedent dictates that the lapse of time between the event and the
disclosure has no bearing on the question of invasion of privacy be-
cause one of the established pre-conditions to a successful recovery of
damages for public disclosure of private matter has not been met, i.e.,
the privateness of the fact disclosed.9"
Even where the facts disclosed are not part of a criminal record but
rather were once public property, most jurisdictions and especially
California have consistently held that mere lapse of time by itself cannot
diminish the newsworthiness of those facts, including names, nor strip
The necessity for revision of Dean Prosser's recent statement as a result of Briscoe
is obvious.
90. See Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 203, 235 (1970), and cases compiled therein.
91. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 827-28 (footnotes omitted).
92. See note 89 supra.
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the press of the privilege to accurately recount them. For example,
in response to the plaintiff's contention that the lapse of time between
the event and the later reporting of the event diminished the defend-
ant's First Amendment protection, the California court of appeal in
Smith v. National Broadcasting Co. 9 3 said:
[I]ncidents which have aroused the public interest, have been fre-
frequently revivified long after their occurrence in the literature, jour-
nalism, or other media of communication of a later day. These events,
being embedded in the communal history, are proper material for such
recounting. It is well established, therefore, that the mere passage of
time does not preclude the publication of such incidents from the life
of one formerly in the public eye which are already public property.
9 4
The spirit of this principle was reiterated by the California court of ap-
peal in Werner v. Times-Mirror Co.,95 where the lapse of time was
thirty years:
[O]ne quite legitimate function of the press is that of educating or
reminding the public as to past history. . . [T]he revival of past
events that once were news, can properly be a matter of present public
interest. . . . [O]nce a man has become a public figure, or news, he
remains a matter of legitimate recall to the public mind to the end of
his days."'9
6
Clearly at the time of Briscoe there was .ample basis in California law
for the proposition that in certain situations some legitimate public pur-
pose is served by recalling the event, irrespective of the lapse of time
since the event first generated public interest, Furthermore, none of
the California cases since Melvin have severed the name of the actor
from the event as a convenient method of diluting the publication's
First Amendment protection.
93. 138 Cal. App. 2d 807, 292 P.2d 600 (1956).
94. Id. at 814, 292 P.2d at 604.
95. 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1961).
96. Id. at 118, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 212, quoting Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIP. L. Rnv. 383,
418 (1960). "The [Werner] court's decision that a thirty-year time lag could not
transmute a truthful matter public at the time of original publication into a matter
presently private followed on substantial current authority." 9 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 862,
869 (1962) (footnote omitted). Similarly, in Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc.,
210 Cal. App. 2d 733, 20 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1962), where the lapse of time was 18
years, the court said:
The privilege of ...enlightening the public as to matters of interest is not re-
stricted to current events; magazines ...may legitimately inform and entertain
the public with the reproduction of past events. . . . [Mlere lapse of time does
not prohibit publication. Id. at 746, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
See also Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. 2d 704, 705, 211 P.2d 320, 321 (1949) (lapse
of time of more than 10 years).
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In the leading federal case of Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp.,97 a for-
mer child prodigy, who, loathing public attention, had-sought oblivion,
claimed an invasion of his privacy by an unvarnished factual account
of his life in The New Yorker magazine. The article covered the thirty
years which he had lived out of the public eye and touched on many
personal details. It was held that:
Regrettably or not, the misfortunes and frailties of neighbors and "pub-
lic figures" are subjects of considerable interest and discussion to the
rest of the population. And when such are the mores of the com-
munity, it would be unwise for a court to bar their expression in the
newspapers, books, and magazines of the day.98
Judge Clark, in denying the existence of a cause of action, observed
that Mr. Sidis was inescapably public.99
In Barbieri v. News-Journal Co.,100 the Delaware supreme court
was confronted with a set of facts strikingly similar to those in Briscoe.
In that case the defendant published an article concerning the last re-
corded use of the whipping post in Delaware nine years earlier. The
plaintiff was named as the criminal involved. Plaintiff Barbieri alleged
that he had reformed and had therefore reacquired his right to privacy.
The court disagreed and dismissed his complaint:
[W]e cannot agree to impose upon the public press a legal standard
founded on such considerations. There must be something more
than the mere publication of facts of record relating to a matter of pub-
lic interest. . . . There is nothing in the articles here complained of
which violates the ordinary decencies. .... 101
Excluding the disclosure of Briscoe's name from the category of
information which the public has a right to know ignores the very rea-
son why society does not erase the criminal's name from the public
records once his punishment has been terminated. Our society has
reserved the right to know who among us has committed a criminal
offense. It is well-established that the returnee rate of those who leave
prison is substantial.10 2  If, in fact, there is even a 50-percent chance
97. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
98. Id. at 809.
99. Id. Cf. Estill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 186 F.2d 1017 (7th Cir. 1951) (picture
showing plaintiff as he looked 15 years earlier, when he was a prosecuting attorney,
with John Dillinger's hand on his shoulder, did not constitute an invasion of privacy);
Samuel v. Curtis Pub. Co., 122 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Cal. 1954) (lapse of time of two
years did not destroy privilege if the picture was originally newsworthy).
100. 189 A.2d 773 (Del. 1963).
101. Id. at 776-77 (emphasis added).
102. FBI, UNIFORM CRImE REPoRTs-1969, at 35-39 (1970).
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that a "rehabilitated" felon will return to a life of crime within a few
years after his release from penal custody, reasonable law-abiding men
can certainly claim an interest in knowing who among them has a crim-
inal record.
More importantly, the use of names in true reports of the type at
issue in Briscoe lends a necessary touch of credibility to the article
itself. The right of the press to publish news necessarily includes the
right to publish believable, authentic news in a literary style of the
publisher's own unfettered choice. If the names of past criminals were
unavailable for publication, an article similar to that involved in Bris-
coe, 03 educating the public about crime in our nation,10 4 could lack
the desired authenticity and immediacy needed to stir people to take
preventive action. Moreover, the intermittent identification of the ac-
tors in a news story reporting crime generally constitutes a common
and widely used literary style in the press industry which promotes in-
teresting and readable articles.10 5
Though the scope and tenor of Justice Peters' discussion seems to
discount the importance of these interests, it is possible that they were
not ignored altogether. In delineating the factual issues toward the
end of his opinion, Justice Peters listed as the fourth element for the
trier of fact's consideration, "whether any independent justification for
printing plaintiff's identity existed."'1 6  Nowhere in the opinion is it
suggested what factors may tend to show such justification. But the
interest in publishing believable reports in one's own literary style might
provide the requisite "independent justification." The argument would
be especially strong when the identity of the particular plaintiff could
substantially affect the authenticity of the article.
Justice Peters did not disapprove or overrule the apparently incon-
sistent California cases on the lapse of time issue, nor did he confront
the similarly inconsistent out-of-state decisions. The reason for this
inattention probably lies in the fact that in none of the cases, except
Barbieri, was there involved -an identification of a past criminal. The
only interest asserted in behalf of the plaintiff in each case was the
103. Big Business, supra note 5.
104. There can be no doubt that one quite legitimate function of the press is that
of educating or reminding the public as to past history, and that the recall of
former public figures, the revival of past events that one [sic] were news, can
properly be a matter of present public interest. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 827.
Cf. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 269 n.2 (1971).
105. Of approximately twenty past crimes that were reported in the article, one-half
related the name of the actor in the crime. Big Business, supra note 5.
106. 4 Cal. 3d at 543, 483 P.2d at 44, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
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nebulous right to privacy, a privacy which was voluntarily relinquished
some years earlier, never to be regained merely because of the passage
of time. However, when the plaintiff is a former criminal, Justice
Peters saw the identification of that plaintiff by name as contradictory
to society's interest in the rehabilitative process. 10 7  Hence, where the
plaintiff is a past criminal, the mere lapse of time may provide a basis
for a cause of action for invasion of privacy.
Significantly, the interjection of the societal interest in rehabilitation
fits neatly within the Meikeljohn theory discussed above.'08 If the
identification of Briscoe falls outside the public's right to know as de-
fined by Meikeljohn, it receives only limited protection as a private
right under the due process clauses of the Constitution.'0 9 This is pos-
sible since Meikeljohn views the right to a free press as both a public
and a private right:
The right of a private person to publish, unlike the public right to
know, is subject to limitation; but the limitation may only be exer-
cised where it bears some reasonable relationship to a valid public
purpose. In other words, the public right to know those things rele-
vant to the aims of self-government is protected under the first amend-
ment and is absolute and unlimited. There is also, however, a private
right to publish that is protected under the due process clause of the
fifth amendment and that, like any other private right, is subject to
reasonable limitation in, the public interest."0
Since the Briscoe court characterized the plaintiff's right to privacy as a
private right,"' that interest standing alone would not be sufficiently
public to justify a limitation on the defendant's exercise of his private
right to publish. However, when the full weight of society's interest in
the rehabilitative process is considered as a factor in favor of the plain-
tiff, there emerges a sufficiently valid public purpose which may oper-
ate to limit the right to publish.
C. The State's Interest in the Rehabilitative Process
Competing with the social need for reports on criminal activity by
a free press, and militating in favor of protecting the individual's pri-
vacy, is the state's interest in the integrity of the rehabilitative process.""
107. Id. at 524, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
108. See text accompanying notes 64-78 supra.
109. Bloustein, supra note 50, at 627.
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. See note 50 supra.
112. 4 Cal. 3d at 538, 483 P.2d at 40, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
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On this issue, Justice Peters kelied heavily on Melvin, wherein it was
stated:
One of the major objectives of society as it is now constituted, and of
the administration of our penal system, is the rehabilitation of the
fallen and the reformation of the criminal. Under these theories
of sociology it is our object to lift up and sustain the unfortunate
rather than tear him down. Where a person has by his own efforts
rehabilitated himself, we, as right-thinking members of society, should
permit him to continue in the path of rectitude rather than throw him
back into a life of shame or crime. Even the thief on the cross was
permitted to repent during the hours of his final agony."83
Obviously, as the court pointed out, "[O]ne of the premises of the re-
habilitative process is that the rehabilitated offender can rejoin that
great bulk of the community from which he has been ostracized.
S. ."114 This assimilation is held out by the state as one of the re-
wards available to the rehabilitated felon: an incentive to do well
with an expectation of later anonymity.115 There should be a point
in time when a formerly public, now rehabilitated, man is allowed to
revert to private life." 6 Justice Peters emphasized that Briscoe had
paid his debt to society."17 Disclosure of Briscoe's past more than
eleven years after his criminal blunder must surely have put him in
"social jeopardy," thereby greatly increasing his original punishment.1 8
113. 112 Cal. App. at 292, 297 P. at 93 (emphasis added). Consistent with the
de-emphasis of Melvin's self-imposed rehabilitation, Justice Peters, in quoting Melvin,
deleted the words "by his own efforts." 4 Cal. 3d at 539, 483 P.2d at 41, 93 Cal.
Rptr. at 873.
114. 4 Cal. 3d at 539, 483 P.2d at 41, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
115. Id. This is one of several incentives in the penal system. Another is inde-
terminate sentencing. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1168 (West 1972). The purpose of inde-
terminate sentencing is "to put before the prisoner great incentive to well-doing in
order that his will to do well should be strengthened and confirmed by the habit of
well-doing." In re Lee, 177 Cal. 690, 692, 171 P. 958, 959 (1918); accord, Grasso v.
McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 264 Cal. App. 2d 597, 600, 70 Cal. Rptr. 458, 460
(1968).
116. 4 Cal. 3d at 539, 483 P.2d at 41, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
117. Id. at 540, 483 P.2d at 41, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
118. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution commands: "iNor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb ...... U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. To the same effect is CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
It is suggested that the threat of social ostracism through exposure is akin to being
twice put in jeopardy: a punishment which is possibly far worse than that originally
imposed by the judicial system and certainly contrary to the theoretical goals of re-
habilitation. Moreover, social ostracism may amount to cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment. Recently, "cruel and unusual" has been interpreted to
include the imposition of mental anguish as well as physical pain. See People v.
Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 649-50, 493 P.2d 880, 894-95, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 166-67
(1972).
NOTES
Unfortunately, however, the use of Melvin to emphasize the impor-
tance of rehabilitation is not convincing. The plaintiff in Melvin was
not an ex-criminal, supposedly rehabilitated by a public penal system,
but an alleged ex-prostitute acquitted on a murder charge who had
privately amended her immoral ways." 9 To effectuate this private
rehabilitation Mrs. Melvin had changed her name.120 The defendants
in Melvin not only disclosed the plaintiff's past misconduct, but went
further and divulged her maiden name as well, not for the purpose of
authenticity, but apparently for sensationalism. 2' Clearly Mrs. Melvin
could have reached the rehabilitative state propounded by Justice Peters
in Briscoe but for the defendant's adverse publicity. It is equally clear
that in Melvin, where the plaintiff was never a convicted criminal, but
rather a possible participant in victimless breaches of morals, there was
a strong societal interest in encouraging complete social rehabilitation.
However, it is questionable whether such a complete rehabilitation is
truly society's goal when the object of the process is a convicted crim-
inal, whose name and past history are a matter of public record. To
Justice Peters the rehabilitative purpose is therapeutic-the product of
an increasingly aware and benevolent society.' 22 But if the product of
our legislators is indicative of the will of the people, the catalyst behind
the rheoric of rehabilitation is in actuality social defense and nothing
more. For example, the California Constitution provides for the ineli-
gibility of ex-felons to hold public office, serve on juries, or vote.12 3
The California Evidence Code specifically provides for the admissibility
of a prior felony conviction to impeach the credibility of a convicted
felon when he is a witness at trial, notwithstanding the nature of the
prior conviction. 2 4 In the federal system, the receipt, possession or
transportation of firearms by a convicted felon is unlawful, 25 notwith-
standing the constitutional "right of the people to keep and bear
Arms."' 2 6 Inasmuch as these "anti-felon" provisions are indicative of
the will of the people-the public policy-they illustrate that the true
purpose, nature and meaning of society's interest in the rehabilitation
119. 112 Cal. App. at 286, 297 P. at 91.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 290-92, 297 P. at 92-94.
122. For the view that the protection of individual privacy is important to preserve
the "Christian notion of the possibility of redemption" see V. PACKARD, THE NAKED
SocmT 12 (1964).
123. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 11.
124. CAL. EvD. CODE § 788 (West 1968). But see People v. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d
441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972).
125. 18 U.S.C. APP. § 1201-03 (1970).
126. U.S. CoNST. amend. II.
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of past criminals is strictly preventive. It is not the public policy of the
State of California to return the past criminal to society as if he had
no opprobrious past, but rather to prevent his return to that criminal
element which exists in every community. In short, society "forgives
without forgetting"' 2 and guards the right to do so zealously. In this
light it is doubtful whether the rehabilitative interest in a case like Bris-
coe has as much importance in the ultimate balancing of competing in-
terest as Justice Peters would have one believe. In the absence of a
positive correlation between the possibility of disclosure and Briscoe's
tendency to return to the criminal element, the societal interest in the
rehabilitative process would seem to be an irrelevant factor in the
weighing process.
In summation of his discussion on rehabilitation, Justice Peters pic-
tured the defendant, Reader's Digest, as an immense communicative
vehicle which would allow "the past" to pursue Briscoe:
[A]s if in some bizarre canyon of echoes, petitioner's past life pur-
sues him through the pages of Reader' Digest, now published in 13
languages and distributed in 100 nations, with a circulation in Califor-
nia alone of almost 2,000,000 copies.
1 28
It is too late in the day to contend that the power position of the de-
fendant should be an irrelevant consideration in the ultimate determi-
nation of the existence of tort liability in California. The socio-eco-
nomic status of a defendant has become an increasingly dominant factor
in California tort law.129  In 1970 Justice Tobriner stated that the
California Supreme Court was tending toward a jurisprudential approach
which looks to the status of the defendant and the harm done to the
plaintiff as primary considerations in the determination of the plain-
tiff's right to recover.'3 0 As early as 1968 one writer observed:
127. Karst, supra note 46, at 369, wherein the author uses this phrase to character-
ize California legislation purportedly allowing a convicted criminal to clear his record
and make a fresh start.
128. 4 Cal. 3d at 540, 483 P.2d at 42, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
129. See Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 456 P.2d 674,
79 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1969); Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451
P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969); Connor v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal.
2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108,
443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). Each of these cases emphasizes the socio-
economic status of the defendant. In each, traditional legalisms which would normally
operate against the plaintiff are easily overcome, due in part to a realization that as
between the plaintiff and the defendant, the latter is better able to bear the loss.
130. Tobriner, The Demise of the Concept of Duty of Defendant, Los Angeles
Metropolitan News, Jan. 9, 1970, at 1-2. Justice Trobriner explained:
Our current crowded and computerized society compels an interdependence of
its members which inevitably brings changes in the law that governs it. The
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[T]ort liability is increasingly moving away from the fault principle-
which, itself, has lost the moral connotation of former centuries-and
. . . to an ever-increasing extent, status-like insurance is substituted
for the individual responsibility flowing from the tortious act ...
The growth of the new status versus individual freedom means that le-
gal liability again results more and more from a given position-as
employer, land owner, consumer, worker-rather than from the ex-
ercise of the free will by an independent individual.' 3 '
However, past California "status liability" tort cases, unlike Briscoe,
did not involve a competing interest of constitutional dimensions. 32
The existence of constitutional considerations would seem to militate
against the defendant's status playing such a dominant role in de-
veloping a vehicle for the imposition of liability. It is essential that
the court fairly weigh the competing interests with an open mind and
a minimum of presupposed preferences, so that liability will not be
imposed at the expense of what may be our most vital social need-a
free press. It is no doubt due to these considerations that Justice Peters
did not rely on the "status liability" approach, but instead carefully
balanced the competing interests involved, keeping in mind the fact
that "[t]he right to know and the right to have others not know are,
simplistically considered, irreconcilable.""
D. The Qualification of the' Right To Disseminate News
In the wake of its impassioned dissertation on society's interest in
the rehabilitation of Briscoe, the court declared that, although it was
always difficult to withhold publication of any news items, "the great
open spaces of a frontier America that permitted physical and economic freedom,
a laissez-faire economy and a laissez-faire law, have been replaced by apartment
houses, skyscrapers, and a complexity of legal rules. The very fact that people are
pressed together in closely packed communities necessarily forces changes in
their legal relationships ...
In our integrated industrial state, the courts have become less sensitive to the
action of the tortfeasor and more sensitive to the injury to the tort victim. The
increase in danger to the individual from the incidents of technology, and the new
emphasis upon the protection of the individual, have combined to shift the in-
quiry from the nature of the wrong committed to the nature of the harm done.
These developments are symbols of deeper trends. They show a philosophical
turning of the courts to the concept of status. Status rights and obligations are
those which arise from the inherent relationships of the parties; they are meas-
ured by the reasonable expectations of the plaintiff as to the performance of the
product or the conduct of the defendant in the life situation, they arise from the
position, or status, of the party rather than from his voluntary act. Id.
131. W. FRIEDMANN, LAw IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 372 (abr. ed. 1964) (emphasis
added).
132. Compare Briscoe with the cases cited in note 129 supra.
133. 4 Cal. 3d at 541, 483 P.2d at 42, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
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general interest in an unfettered press may at times be outweighed by
other great societal interests.' 34  Without further hesitation or discus-
sion, Justice Peters promptly elevated Briscoe's right to privacy, pre-
sumably coupled with society's interest in the rehabilitative process, to
the position of such a "great societal interest."'18 Thus, having rejected
an absolute protection for the press,13 6 the court faced the task of devis-
ing a standard which would adequately delimit the boundaries within
which the news media would be protected.
A parallel was initially drawn to Time, Inc. v. Hill,117 wherein the
United States Supreme Court was similarly concerned with balancing
the right to a free press against the right to privacy.3 s The Court in
134. Id. at 540, 483 P.2d at 42, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
135. Id. at 540-41, 483 P.2d at 42, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 874. But see note 32 supra
for the proposition that the right to privacy is itself a constitutional right. In this
view Briscoe involves a conflict between two constitutional rights-the right to privacy
and the right of a free press--if state action is found to be involved in the Reader's
Digest publication.
136. Absolute protection of the press under the guise of the First Amendment has
been urged by Justices Black and Douglas but has never been adopted by the Su-
preme Court. The concurring opinion of Justices Black and Douglas in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 297 (1964) (footnote omitted), expressed the
view that "alan unconditional right to say what one pleases about public affairs is . . .
the minimum guarantee of the First Amendment." The New York Times case con-
cerned a city commissioner of public affairs who brought a defamation action against
the New York Times concerning publication of a full-page paid advertisement describing
racial discrimination in Montgomery, Alabama, against black students and leaders who
were protesting segregation. The Court specifically held unconstitutional an Alabama
defamation law that penalized honest, factual inaccuracies without requiring a showing
of "actual malice." The New York Times Court defined actual malice as knowledge
that a statement is false or reckless disregard of whether it is false or not. Id. at
279-80. The views of Justices Black and Douglas as expressed above closely parallel
the Meikeljohn theory of the First Amendment. See text accompanying notes 64-78
supra. Since, as discussed earlier, the Briscoe court took the disclosure of Briscoe's
name out of the realm of the public's right to know, it is not surprising that the de-
fendant's interest in the dissemination of news would be deemed "qualified." See text
accompanying notes 108-11 supra.
Justice Black's absolutist view of the First Amendment was again expressed in his
concurring opinion in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 398-99 (1967). He said that
even limitations on freedom of speech when the speech is characterized as
"malicious" and particularly "reckless disregard of the truth" can never serve as
effective substitutes for the First Amendment words: . . . make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. ." Experience, I think, is
bound to prove that First Amendment freedoms can no more be permanently
diluted or abridged by this Court's action than could the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of right to counsel.
137. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
138. Time involved a "private" plaintiff who scrupulously avoided publicity but was
nevertheless placed in a "false light in the public eye" by a magazine article connect-
ing his family with the content of a new play. This play was patterned after a front-
page news story, but with additional fictionalized and sensationalized elements about
NOTES
Time construed the New York privacy statute as not including a cause
of action for invasion of privacy where the alleged invasion was the
truthful and factual reporting bf newsworthy people or events. 139 Jus-
tice Peters, however, seized upon a passing footnote comment in Time
as an example of an important limitation on the right to publish truthful
newsworthy material. The footnote included an observation that the
fact that the material published may be newsworthy will not "fore-
close an interpretation . . to allow damages where 'Revelations may
be so intimate and so unwarranted in view of the victim's position as
to outrage the community's notions of decency.' . . ."110
In his haste to fashion a limitation upon the right of the press to dis-
close true facts which are a matter of public record and in an obvious
effort to attach Supreme Court authoritativeness to this "offensiveness"
qualification, Justice Peters failed to note that the Time Court extracted
its footnote comment from Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp.'4 An exami-
nation of Sidis reveals that the statement is clearly dictum. Even though
the Sidis court characterized the publicity thrust upon the former child
prodigy as a "ruthless exposure of a once public character,"' 42 it de-
nied him relief. The reason for the denial lies at the heart of the cause
of action for invasion of privacy based on a truthful public disclosure
of private facts-the facts disclosed must be private.143 In Sidis it was
found that the plaintiff was inescapably public.4  The Briscoe court,
on the other hand, apparently discarded the heretofore well-recognized
public record category of non-private facts and by implication decided
that the identification of Marvin Briscoe as a former criminal, taken
from his criminal record, would be a public disclosure of a private fact.
It is only when the condition of privateness is met that the offensive-
the plaintiff's family being held hostage within their home by three escaped convicts.
Time was a suit for invasion of privacy, not defamation, yet many recent defamation
cases have relied substantially on the Time view of "public interest" in determining
the applicability of the New York Times standard. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metro-
media, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Konigsberg v. Time, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); Arizona Biochemical Co. v. Hearst Corp., 302 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
DeSalvo v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 300 F. Supp. 742 (D. Mass. 1969).
139. 385 U.S. at 381-83.
140. Id. at 383 n.7, quoting Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940). The Time Court has used this footnote in
its opinion as an exception to the absolute defense of "truthfulness" in privacy actions
under New York's Civil Rights Statutes.
141. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940). For an additional
discussion of Sidis see text accompanying notes 97-99 supra.
142. 113 F.2d at 807.
143. PRossER, supra note 31, at 810.
144. 113 F.2d at 809.
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ness of the disclosure takes on its relevancy. Offensiveness operates
as a limitation on the maintenance of this kind of privacy action. The
offensiveness of the disclosure becomes not only relevant but necessary
to the successful imposition of liability.'4 Justice Peters combined the
elements of private fact and offensiveness in concluding that a "truthful
publication is constitutionally protected if (1) it is newsworthy and
(2) it does not reveal facts so offensive as to shock the community's
notions of decency.' 1 46  As worded, this statement seems to require
that all published material meet both limitations in order to invoke
First Amendment protection. Interpreted quite literally, if the Reader's
Digest article was newsworthy, but was also offensive to the reason-
able man, then the constitutional protection would be withdrawn. How-
ever, Justice Peters later defined newsworthiness in part by the offensive
character of the article. If the article would be shockingly offensive
to the reasonable man in the plaintiff's situation, then it is not news-
worthy. This approach avoids the constitutionally suspect result of
withdrawing protection from a defendant who published an admittedly
newsworthy article. Thus, the pivotal element in the Briscoe test is
the degree of offensiveness. The Time emphasis on the newsworthiness
limitation 147 was supplanted in Briscoe by a primary emphasis on the
offensiveness limitation.
E. Newsworthiness Defined
Since the California Supreme Court's recent definition of "newsworthi-
ness" in Kapellas v. Kofman 48 failed to expressly mention the offen-
145. The final limitation is that the matter made public [private facts] must be
one which would be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary
sensibilities. . . . The ordinary reasonable man does not take offense at mention
in a newspaper of the fact that he has returned home from a visit, or gone
camping in the woods, or given a party' at his house for his friends. It is quite a
different matter when the details of sexual relations are spread before the public
eye, or there is highly personal portrayal of his intimate private characteristics or
conduct. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 811-12 (footnotes omitted).
As can be seen from the above statement of the "general rule" the private nature of
the matter disclosed is determined apart from its offensiveness. This is exemplified
by the "once public, always publie" principle previously discussed. However, it has
been suggested that this principle is only an exception and that generally the public or
private nature of the subject matter depends upon its offensiveness. 9 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 862, 869 (1962).
146. 4 Cal. 3d at 541, 483 P.2d at 42-43, 93 Cal.-Rptr. at 874-75 (emphasis added).
This "offensiveness" qualification on the right to disseminate news has been consid-
ered by a number of privacy cases prior to Briscoe. Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 242-44
(1970).
147. 385 U.S. at 387-88.
148. 1 Cal. 3d 20, 459 P.2d 912, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1969). In Kapellas the
plaintiff was a woman who ran for public office in the City of Alameda, California.
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siveness element, the Briscoe court proceeded to determine the news-
worthiness of the Reader's Digest article through an elastic application
of three factors considered in Kapellas.1
49
The court concluded as to the first Kapellas factor, "the social value
of the facts published,"' 50 that a jury could find that publication of
plaintiff's identity was of "minimal social value."'15  The rationale for
this conclusion was that Reader's Digest had "no independent reason
whatsoever for focusing public attention on Mr. Briscoe . . . at this
time," that "[a] jury could certainly find that Mr. Briscoe had once
again become an anonymous member of the community," and that
"[o]nce legal proceedings have concluded, and . . . the individual has
reverted to the lawful and unexciting life led by the rest of the com-
munity, the public's interest in knowing is less compelling."'
The second Kapellas factor considered was "'the depth of the article's
intrusion into [the] ostensibly private affairs!" of plaintiff Briscoe. 5
Not surprisingly it was observed that "a jury might find that revealing
one's criminal past for all to see is grossly offensive to most people in
America. Certainly a criminal background is kept even more hidden
from others than a humiliating disease. . ... 14 The emphasis here
was placed on the harm done by such a revelation: "ostracism, isola-
tion, and the alienation of one's family."' 55  The offensiveness of the
intrusion, rather than its depth, was weighed.
The third and last Kapellas factor considered by the Briscoe court
was "'the extent to which the party [plaintiff] voluntarily acceded to a
A local newspaper ran a story concerning her competence as the mother of her six
children, specifically mentioning the police records of three of her children for minor
violations of the local laws. The Supreme Court of California dismissed her cause of
action for invasion of privacy, in part because the court found that the item was news-
worthy. Id. at 35-39, 459 P.2d at 921-24, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 369-72.
149. Id. at 36, 459 P.2d at 922, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 370, where the court said:
In determining whether a particular incident is "newsworthy" and thus whether
the privilege shields its truthful publication from liability, the courts consider a
variety of factors, including [11 the social value of the facts published, [2] the
depth of the article's intrusion into ostensibly private affairs, and [31 the extent
to which the party voluntarily acceded to a position of public notoriety. (emphasis
added).
150. Id.
151. 4 Cal. 3d at 541, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
152. Id. at 541-42, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
153. Id. at 541, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875, quoting Kapellas, 1 Cal.
3d at 36, 459 P.2d at 922, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
154. 4 Cal. 3d at 542, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875; see Barber v. Time, Inc.,
348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
155. 4 Cal. 3d at 542, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875,
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position of public notoriety.' "156 Justice Peters concluded that the
plaintiff "in no way . . .voluntarily consented to the publicity ac-
corded him here,"157 because he made every effort to have others for-
get that he once hijacked a truck.158 This is a significant modification
of the third Kapellas factor. The inquiry should have been whether
the plaintiff's entry into the public arena was of his own volition, not
whether he voluntarily acceded to this kind of publicity. Obviously
Briscoe would not want the facts of his prior crime published. How-
ever, Briscoe's crime must have been intentional.15 9 Consequently, he
clearly entered voluntarily into the public arena when he committed
the hijacking. 110  For example, in Smith v. National Broadcasting
Co.'60 it was said:
[W]here a person intentionally places himself in the public eye, or by
the particular character of his conduct or activities has acquired, or
has had thrust upon him, public notoriety, he relinquishes the right to
live that segment of his life which has thus engaged the public interest
absolutely free from public scrutiny.'
62
The Briscoe court utilized Kapellas as its sole authority in defining
newsworthiness and concluded that a jury could find that Briscoe's iden-
tification as a former hijacker was not newsworthy. 63 However, Justice
Peters' discussion of newsworthiness should also have included a fourth
important factor considered in Kapellas. This factor, as stated in Kapel-
las, concerns the public nature of the material:
If the information reported has previously become part of the "public
domain" or the intrusion into an individual's private life is only slight,
publication will be privileged even though the social utility of the
publication may be minimal. On the other hand, when the legitimate
public interest in the published information is substantial, a much
greater intrusion into an individual's private life will be sanctioned,
especially if the individual willingly entered into the public sphere.' 0 4
This public domain factor has been a familiar limitation in the area
156. Id. at 541, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875, quoting Kapellas, 1 Cal. 3d at
36, 459 P.2d at 922, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
157. 4 Cal. 3d at 542, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
158. Id.
159. See Complaint No. 944396, supra note 4, count V, at 2.
160. See Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. 2d 315, 323, 239 P.2d 876, 880 (1952).
161. 138 Cal. App. 2d 807, 292 P.2d 600 (1956).
162. Id. at 812, 292 P.2d at 603; accord Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp., 108
Cal. App. 2d 191, 194, 238 P.2d 670, 672 (1951).
163. 4 Cal. 3d at 541, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875.




of privacy, 165 and the significance of its absence from Justice Peters'
opinion has already been discussed. Generally it is said that "'there
can be no privacy in that which is already public."' 166 The reason for
the court's apparent turnabout in Briscoe is unclear, except that the in-
clusion of this element would have effectively barred any recovery by
Briscoe.167 Plaintiff Briscoe himself conceded that the published ac-
tivity (his crime) and his name were matters of public record.1 68
Once again the significance of the societal interest in rehabilitation be-
comes apparent. That is, a possible explanation for the court's incon-
sistency in applying the public record limitation might lie in the ab-
sence of the rehabilitation interest in Kapellas and its existence in Bris-
coe. Hence, it is possible that the California Supreme Court has not
rejected the public record category of facts for all privacy cases. Ar-
guably, only where the societal interest in rehabilitation of former crim-
inals is threatened with frustration will facts which are a matter of one's
criminal and public record be looked upon as private.
I. THE PRIMA FACE CASE
Justice Peters concluded the weighing process by re-emphasizing the
societal interests at stake.1 69  In addition to the right of privacy and
the right of publication, the court specifically included the right to
rehabilitation, saying that "[a] jury might well find that a continuing
threat that the rehabilitated offender's old identity will be resurrected by
the media is counter-productive to the goals of [the penal system]."' 7 °
Noting that "'the balance is always weighted in favor of free expres-
sion,' ,,'71 lest First Amendment rights be chilled with uncertainty,
17
Justice Peters delivered the general holding of the court, requiring "a
plaintiff to prove, in each case, that the publisher invaded his privacy
with reckless disregard for the fact that reasonable men would find the
invasion highly offensive."' 73
165. See PRossER, supra note 31, at 810-11.
166. Smith v. National Broadcasting Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 807, 812, 292 P.2d 600,
603 (1956), quoting Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 290, 297 P. 91, 93 (1931);
accord, Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 230, 253 P.2d 441, 444
(1953).
167. See note 89 supra.
168. Appellant's Opening Brief at 3, Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District,
State of California, 2nd Civ. No. 35307.
169. 4 Cal. 3d at 542, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
170. Id.
171. Id., quoting Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489, 491 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
172. 4 Cal. 3d at 542-43 n.18, 483 P.2d at 43-44 n.18, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875-76 n.18.
173. Id. at 542-43, 483 P.2d at 44, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 876 (footnote omitted) (empha-
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The courts have consistently refused to delineate the prima facie case
necessary for recovery for invasion of one's privacy. This reluctance
has engendered much criticism. Professor Kalven has voiced a typical
frustration:
To begin with, the tort has no legal profile. We do not know what
constitutes a prima facie case, we do not know on what basis damages
are to be measured, we do not know whether the basis of liability is
limited to intentional invasions or includes also negligent invasions and
even strict liability.
174
The Briscoe court managed to avoid assigning any "clear profile" to
the tort by distributing numerous partial definitions throughout the
opinion, several of which are contradictory. However, spurred on by
its own expressed distaste for "ad hoc" balancing, 175 the court con-
structed a few guideposts that apparently lead to a prima facie case con-
taining the following elements: (1) a public disclosure, (2) of private
facts, (3) which disclosure would be highly offensive to a reasonable
man in the plaintiff's situation and (4) which was made with reckless
disregard for its offensiveness. These four elements which Briscoe
must prove to prevail are the end result of the court's balancing process
i.e., its quantitative and qualitative analysis of all the facts and the de-
lineation of the interests to be weighed.
At first blush, this prima facie case does not expressly disclose the
specific criteria to be used in determining the "newsworthiness" of the
published matter. But elements two and three together should be un-
derstood as encompassing the three factors taken from Kapellas and the
rehabilitation and offensiveness factors as developed in Briscoe.170  A
favorable jury finding for the plaintiff, respecting the four elements of
this prima facie case, would necessarily result in a factual determina-
tion of the non-newsworthiness of the material at issue.'
77
The third prima facie element, the disclosure's offensiveness to the
reasonable man, reflects the depth of the article's intrusion into the pri-
sis added). It must be assumed that the Briscoe court inserted the words "reckless
disregard" in an attempt to satisfy the New York Times "actual malice" standard.
In New York Times, actual malice was defined as "knowing falsity or reckless disregard
for falsity." The Briscoe court replaced the word "falsity" with the word "offensive-
ness." See text accompanying notes 199-207 infra.
174. Kalven, supra note 79, at 333. An interesting retort to this statement was
made by Mr. Bloustein, who expressed a contrary view on the definitiveness of the
privacy tort: "The reason Kalven fails to see the profile of the tort is that he does
not want to see it." Bloustein, supra note 50, at 618.
175. 4 Cal. 3d at 542-43 n.18, 483 P.2d at 43-44 n.18, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875-76 n.18.
176. Id. at 541-43, 483 P.2d at 43-44, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875-76.
177. 1 Cal. 3d at 36, 459 P.2d at 922, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 370 (1969).
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vate affairs of the plaintiff. 1 7  In its discussion of this factor, the Bris-
coe court specifically concluded that "a jury might find that revealing
one's criminal past for all to see is grossly offensive to most people in
America."'179 Moreover, as will be shown, if this element is satisfied
(if the jury finds the facts disclosed were "highly" offensive), then it
could very easily follow that prima facie element number four (pub-
lished with a reckless disregard for its offensiveness) would also be sat-
isfied.
Closely related to the second prima facie element (private facts)
seems to be the recognition of the defendant's right to assert an inde-
pendent justification for printing the plaintiff's name. No explanation
of the meaning or effect of this right in any particular case was given.
Clearly, if Briscoe directly or indirectly consented to the publicity, this
would provide the requisite independent justification for disclosure.18
Moreover the necessitous nature of the disclosure may be an inde-
pendent justification for identifying Briscoe by name.18 1 Necessity
may exist where the authenticity of the article depends upon identifi-
cation by name or where Briscoe, or any similar plaintiff, has a single
and central importance to the material.
A. Offensiveness
This limitation upon the press to print only material which is not
so intimate and unwarranted as to be offensive to the community's
notions of decency was endorsed by privacy cases previous to Briscoe,""2
and noted by authorities in the field of tort law.' 83 The offensiveness
qualification, however, applies only to intimate or private facts.' 84 The
Briscoe opinion presupposes that Briscoe's identity as a convicted felon,
though a matter of public record, is such an intimate and private fact.
If it is the extent of notoriety given Briscoe's criminal record in Reader's
Digest which the court abhors, as compared with that normally attrib-
uted to court records, then the defendant clearly has intruded deeply
into the plaintiff's affairs. However, in Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co.,1 85
178. Id.
179. 4 Cal. 3d at 542, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
180. Indirect consent might be supplied by the current commission or suspicion of
a crime. See id. at 536, 483 P.2d at 39, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
181. See text accompanying notes 103-06 supra.
182. Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 242-44 (1970).
183. See, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 31, at 802-04.
184. See text accompanying notes 141-46 supra.
185. 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953). In this case the defendants published a
photograph of the plaintiffs in Harper's Bazaar magazine in October, 1947. The
1972]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
a photograph which extended knowledge of a particular incident to a
somewhat larger public than had actually witnessed it did not consti-
tute an invasion of the plaintiffs' privacy.'8 6
The Briscoe court continually emphasized that revelation of a crim-
inal past was highly offensive to most people, 187 and went on to assert
that the "publisher [had] every reason to know, before publication,
that identification of a man as a former criminal will be highly offensive
to the individual involved.' 8 8  Thus the reasonable man called for is
one who is in the plaintiff's situation. The same conclusion can be
drawn from the court's direction that the trier of fact determine whether
identification of Briscoe as a former criminal "would be highly offen-
sive and injurious to the reasonable man." 8 9 Justice Peters' inclusion
of the word "injurious" negates any apparent inconsistency. Injury to
the non-plaintiff hypothetical reasonable man, or the community as a
whole, seems totally irrelevant in this area, especially when the diffi-
culties inherent in ascertaining such injury are considered. However,
injury to the individual plaintiff is, of course, relevant and probably
ascertainable. Hence, "highly offensive and injurious to the reasonable
man" means a reasonable man in circumstances similar to those of the
plaintiff, i.e., the reasonable former criminal whose privacy has been
allegedly invaded.' 90 This interpretation of offensiveness could require
very little proof by the plaintiff for compliance. A showing of damage
resulting from the publication, which damage might be naturally fore-
photograph showed the plaintiffs seated in an affectionate pose at their place of busi-
ness in an ice cream concession in the Los Angeles Farmers' Market.
186. Id. at 230, 253 P.2d at 444. The court refused plaintiffs' cause of action for
invasion of privacy, finding that they voluntarily assumed the pose in a public place,
and thus waived their right of privacy as to this pose. The court said: 'The photo-
graph of plaintiffs merely permitted other members of the public, who were not at
plaintiffs' place of business at the time it was taken, to see them as they had volun-
tarily exhibited themselves." Id.
187. E.g., 4 Cal. 3d at 542, 483 P.2d at 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
188. Id. at 543 n.18, 483 P.2d at 44 n.18, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 876 n.18 (emphasis
added in part).
189. Id. at 543, 483 P.2d at 44, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
190. PROSSR, supra note 31, at 811. See also Wade, supra note 41, at 1111. It
would be inconsistent and incredulous if the offensiveness determination required is
in terms of its effect on the community rather than on the individual plaintiff. Briscoe
is a convicted felon who must resume his existence in society subject to a plethora of
state and federal anti-felon statutes (see notes 123-27 and accompanying text). He is
subject to the continued scrutiny of the police and probation officials, and is forever
within the limited view of the public eye. Thus, it seems incongruous that the com-
munity would, on the one hand, condone the policy allowing Brisco's qualified
reassimilation into society and, on the other hand, be "highly" offended by the revela-
tion of his criminal record.
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seeable, would seem to suffice in many instances, absent a showing by
the defendant that the plaintiff actually enjoyed the publicity or that
the plaintiff is supersensitive. 9'
Even though offensiveness is a familiar limitation in the law of inva-
sion of privacy, never has that term been applied so broadly as in
Briscoe. It is generally agreed that the question of whether the dis-
closure would be offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities is one
for the jury to decide,19 unless it is clear that the jury could reach only
one reasonable result. 193  Prior to Briscoe, offensiveness meant "inde-
cent," "lurid," or "vulgar."' 94  Briscoe's own source for this element,
Time, Inc. v. Hill, refers to revelations so unwarranted in view of the
victim's position as to "outrage the community's notions of decency."
19 5
A perusal of past privacy decisions both in California and elsewhere
will show that it is not the communication itself which is to be tested
for its offensiveness, but rather the manner of the disclosure.' 96  If the
truthful disclosure tends to humiliate, not by the mere unembellished
statement of truth but by its context, or is designed to appeal to prurient
interest, then the communication's offensiveness should be a question
for the jury.
197
191. The law is not for the protection of the hypersensitive, and all of us must, to
some reasonable extent, lead lives exposed to the public gaze. PRossER, supra note
31, at 811.
192. E.g., Strickler v. National Broadcasting Co., 167 F. Sapp. 68 (S.D. Cal. 1958);
Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 190 Pa. Super. 528, 154 A.2d 422 (1959); Wade, supra note
41, at 1115-16.
193. Wade, supra note 41, at 1116.
194. See Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 203, 242-44 (1970).
195. 385 U.S. at 383 n.7.
196. See, e.g., Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953),
holding that a picture of a husband and wife in an affectionate pose at their open-air
place of business was not objectionable in itself, but that the trial court should have
permitted an amendment to the complaint to show that the picture was used in an
uncomplimentary context. This same photograph was used by the defendant in Gill v.
Curtis Publishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952), where its publication was
held to be an invasion of privacy primarily because it was used to illustrate an article
characterizing love at first sight as being based 100 percent on sex.
197. See, e.g., Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474
(1964) (picture showing plaintiff in a public place with her dress blown up by air jets
at a fun house); Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952)
(see note 196 supra); Harms v. Miami Daily News, Inc., 127 So. 2d 715 (Fla. App.
1961) (newspaper publishing the statement: "Wanna hear a sexy telephone voice?
Call - and ask for Louise."); Myers v. U.S. Camera Publishing Corp., 9 Misc. 2d
765, 167 N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957) (publication of nude photograph); Semler,
v. Ultem Publications, Inc., 170 Misc. 551, 9 N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y. City Ct. 1938)
(publication of a picture of the plaintiff, a professional model, on the same page with
a risque story); Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 190 Pa. Super. 528, 154 A.2d 422 (1959) (pic-
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In Briscoe, however, the nonsensationalized statement of true facts
from a public record, which constituted only one sentence out of a
five-page article, 19 was felt to contain a sufficient degree of offensive-
ness to be the basis for a jury question. Such a broad definition of the
offensiveness concept greatly expands the tort of invasion of privacy.
B. Publication With Reckless Disregard for
The Disclosure's Offensiveness
It is essential that the fourth prima facie element be analyzed to
determine whether the burden it places on the California press is con-
sistent with burdens imposed by standards developed by the United
States Supreme Court. This element presents the question whether
Reader's Digest published the truck hijacking article "with a reckless
disregard for its offensiveness."' 99  Nowhere in Justice Peters' opinion
is it expressly indicated where this "reckless disregard" standard origi-
nated.200 Apparently, the Briscoe court intended to utilize the Time
test of "reckless or wanton disregard of the plaintiffs' rights."'20 1  Time
also was an invasion of privacy case.20 2 It concerned the defendant's
knowing or reckless failure to make a reasonable investigation into
the true incidents of an ordeal suffered by the plaintiff and his family
three years prior to its unveiling in Life magazine.20 3 The nonde-
famatory article falsely reported that a new Broadway play correctly
portrayed the plaintiff's horrifying experience.2 °4 The Time standard
permits an objective verification of the defendant's attempt to publish
true facts. However, Time is inapposite to Briscoe. In Briscoe falsity
is not part of the plaintiff's theory of recovery. Consequently a stand-
ture of a girl in front of a theater with her arms around a man, illustrating a fiction-
alized account of events in plaintiff's life, including matters of public record).
198. But cf. Fignole v. Curtis Publishing Co., 247 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),
where the court held that a mere one-sentence reference to the plaintiff in a 31/2
page article could not be the basis for a privacy action under a New York statute.
199. 4 Cal. 3d at 543, 483 P.2d at 44, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
200. Justice Peters did state that Briscoe's complaint fulfilled this requirement by
alleging that the Reader's Digest identification of him by name was malicious and
willful. Id. at 543 n.19, 483 P.2d at 44 n.19, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 876 n.19. See 9 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 862, 870-71 (1962), which suggests that ill motive should be a relevant con-
sideration in privacy cases involving a time-lag question. But see Warren & Brandeis,
supra note 32, at 218, where it was said: "Personal ill-will is not an ingredient of the
offence [invasion of privacy], any more than in an ordinary case of trespass to person
or to property."
201. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 395 (1967).
202. See note 138 supra.
203. 385 U.S. at 395-96.
204. Id. at 377.
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ard requiring the plaintiff to prove "knowing or reckless falsity" is
likewise inappropriate to a situation involving an allegedly damaging
but nevertheless true report. The Time court emphatically rejected elu-
sive standards which would make it difficult, and perhaps impossible,
for the news media to utilize objective means of protection:
We create a grave risk of serious impairment of the indispensable serv-
ice of a free press in a free society if we saddle the press with the im-
possible burden of verifying to a certainty the facts associated in news
articles with a person's name, picture or portrait, particularly as re-
lated to non-defamatory matter. Even negligence would be a most
elusive standard, especially when the content of the speech itself affords
no warning of prospective harm to another through falsity. A negli-
gence test would place on the press the intolerable burden of guessing
how a jury might assess the reasonableness of steps taken by it to verify




In light of the particular facts involved, the Time "knowing or reck-
less falsity" test is consistent with the avoidance of elusive standards.
However, "reckless disregard for its offensiveness" is not the same non-
elusive standard as "reckless disregard for its truth or falsity."
"[C]arelessness simply cannot, as a matter of logic, play the same role
in most privacy cases that it plays in defamation cases. 20 6  In situa-
tions similar to Briscoe, involving an allegedly unwarranted but nonde-
famatory and truthful disclosure of one's name in connection with his
criminal past, there are no "steps" or means whereby a publisher prior
to publication can determine the material's offensiveness. Without the
availability of such objective measures, a jury's determination that the
material published was in fact highly offensive to the reasonable man
in the plaintiff's situation would place on the press an "intolerable
burden" of proving that the material was not published in reckless dis-
regard for its offensiveness. Once a determination is made that the
205. Id. at 389 (emphasis added): cf. the comment of Mr. Justice Brandeis, in his
concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927):
Those who won our independence believed ... that public discussion is a political
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government
They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they
knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its
infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that
fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable gov-
ernment; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed
grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is
good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion,
they eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its worst form.
Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the
Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed. Id. (foot-
note omitted).
206. Bloustein, supra note 50, at 616,
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material published was highly offensive to a reasonable man in plain-
tiff's situation, the focus of inquiry narrows to a consideration of why
the material was published. The publisher can offer no explanation or
reason for publishing the highly offensive material except his own self-
serving testimony that at the time of publication he believed the mate-
rial was not highly offensive. The only available protection for the
publisher is an accurate subjective prediction of the material's offensive-
ness to a jury called upon to "second guess" his determination.2 °7
Before Briscoe it might have been assumed that California followed
the Restatement rule which provides for liability only where the de-
fendant-publisher knew or should have known that the disclosure would
be offensive to persons of ordinary sensibilities. 20 8  However, only one
California federal district court decision discussed the matter in these
terms,20 9 and most of the cases which involved offensiveness did not
concern themselves with the question whether the defendant knew or
should have known of the publication's offensive character.210 One
commentator views privacy as an intentional tort, in which motive and
knowledge of the publication's offensiveness become irrelevant.2 11  Ar-
guably, the recklessness standard propounded in Briscoe, standing
alone, is nothing more than a standard which requires a plaintiff to
show that the defendant knew or should have known that the disclosure
would be highly offensive. But coupled with Briscoe's expansive defi-
nition of offensiveness, it is difficult to see how any publisher in a situ-
ation like that of Reader's Digest can escape liability.2 12
It appears that the Briscoe decision has established that kind of
"elusive" standard specifically rejected in Time. The deficiencies in-
herent in such a standard stem not only from its imposition of an in-
207. The elusiveness of such a standard is illuminated by the following analysis of
Briscoe "recklessness": (1) In Briscoe, recovery for invasion of privacy is permitted
if, assuming satisfaction of all other elements of the prima facie case, the plaintiff
shows that the defendant made the disclosure with reckless disregard for its offensive-
ness; (2) however, since in Briscoe an invasion of privacy is essentially defined as a
truthful disclosure of private facts which is highly offensive to a reasonable man in
plaintiff's situation, then (3) the recklessness standard re-stated merely requires that
the plaintiff show and the jury find that the disclosure was made with a reckless dis-
regard of whether it invaded the plaintiff's privacy or not!
208. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867, comment d (1939).
209. Samuel v. Curtis Publishing Co., 122 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
210. Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 203, 217 n.8 (1970).
211. Bloustein, supra note 50, at 616.
212. In the court's own words: "However, there is little uncertainty here. A pub-
lisher does have every reason to know, before publication, that identification of a
man as a former criminal will be highly offensive to the individual involved." 4 Cal. 3d
at 543 n.18, 483 P.2d at 44 n.18, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 876 n.18.
[Vol. 5
NOTES
tolerable burden on the press but from its consequential encouragement
of self-censorship. The United States Supreme Court, in determining
the validity of statutes prohibiting the distribution of constitutionally
unprotected material, has consistently held unconstitutional those stat-
utes which were vague and indefinite. 213  The unconstitutionality of
such statutes, unlike vague statutes not involving freedom of expression,
is rooted not so much in their denial of due process as in their contra-
vention of the First Amendment.214  More specifically, the First Amend-
ment infirmity lies in the statute's tendency to compel self-censorship by
the disseminator and thereby unnecessarily restrict the free flow of
news and other reading matter to the public.2 15  Since in a situation
analogous to that in Briscoe the defendant-publisher will be able to
offer nothing more than his possibly irrelevant belief in the non-offen-
siveness of the publication as a defense to a charge that he recklessly
published highly offensive material, no publisher will know with rea-
sonable certainty whether he will or will not be liable at some future
time. This burden of omniscience will surely encourage protective self-
censorship. Standards which leave the press doubtful as to whether it
could successfully defend a lawsuit or which create "fear of the expense
of having to do so" are wholly inconsistent with the First Amend-
ment.
210
The decision in Briscoe, or more precisely the prima facie case de-
rived therefrom, results paradoxically in allowing greater protection for
defamatory falsehoods than for nondefamatory truthful publications. 217
213. E.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Winters v. New York, 333
U.S. 507 (1948).
214. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509-10 (1948).
215. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1959). In Smith, the absence of a
scienter requirement in a criminal statute prohibiting the retail distribution of obscene
books rendered the statute constitutionally defective. The statute did not give the book-
seller reasonable standards for determining when he had violated its provisions. Be-
cause of this type of vagueness,
[t]he bookseller's self-censorship, compelled by the State, would be a censorship
affecting the whole public, hardly less virulent for being privately administered.
Id. at 154.
Self-censorship was also a primary consideration in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 278-79 (1964).
216. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
217. "'To allow a standard based on factors outside the publisher's control-that of
community notions of decency--only when the revelations turn out to be true is to
provide truth with less certain First Amendment protection than is offered falsity.'"
Note, The Invasion of Defamation by Privacy, 23 STAN. L. Rnv. 547, 558 n.84
(1971), quoting 83 HARv. L. REv. 1722, 1726 (1970).
One writer has suggested that defendants in privacy actions deserve less First
Amendment protection than those accused of publishing falsehoods. Nimmer, supra
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In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 18 it was held that a public official
could recover damages for a defamatory falsehood only upon a showing
that the defendant-press published the false material with "knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not. '21 9  When this same standard was applied in Time, there was no
significant change in the burden placed on the nation's press since
falsity was again a major issue, though the matter published was non-
defamatory and recklessness related to the defendant's efforts to publish
the truth.2 °  In light of such authority the Briscoe court, superficially
within constitutional norms, established "recklessness" as the applicable
standard in actions seeking recovery for a nondefamatory, truthful inva-
sion of one's privacy. But when reckless disregard relates to an illusory
and fluctuating concept of "offensiveness to the reasonable man in the
plaintiff's situation," the elusiveness of such a standard in contrast to
that of "reckless disregard for truth or falsity" increases the burden
placed on the press by decreasing the protection of truthful publica-
tions in relation to the protection afforded defamatory falsehoods. In
New York Times the Court considered that sanctions against either
innocent or negligent misstatements would present a grave hazard of
discouraging the exercise of constitutional guarantees. Fear of large
verdicts in damage suits for innocent or merely negligent misstate-
ment, even fear of the expenses involved in a successful defense tend
to result in statements which "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone.' "221
The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its intention to
hold the press to a standard significantly less burdensome than the
Briscoe standard in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 222 where it said:
In libel cases . . . we view an erroneous verdict for the plaintiff as
most serious. Not o0ily does'.it mulct the defendant for an innocent
misstatement . . . but the possibility of such error, even beyond the
vagueness of the negligence standard' itself, would create a strong im-
petus toward self-censorship, which the First Amendment cannot tol-
erate. These dangers for freedom of speech and press led us to reject
note 78, at 959-67. The author reasons that the damage to reputation caused by
defamation may actually be cured by more speech whereas more speech would only
increase the harm caused by a truthful invasion of privacy. Hence, the deleterious
effect of an invasion of privacy by truthful disclosure is apt to be permanent and
therefore should be more strongly deterred by permitting the injured plaintiffs to
more easily satisfy their claims. Id. at 961.
218. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
219. Id. at 280.
220. 385 U.S. at 394-96 (1967).
221. 376 U.S. at 279, quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
222. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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the reasonable-man standard of liability as "simply inconsistent" with
our national commitment under the First Amendment when sought to
be applied to the conduct of a political campaign. . . . The same
considerations lead us to reject that standard here.
2 23
The facts in Rosenbloom are similar to those in Briscoe in that both
plaintiffs were private parties who sought damages against a large "news
media" publisher. Rosenbloom was one of a number of distributors
of nudist magazines who was arrested for selling obscene literature. In
reporting his arrest, the respondent radio station at first failed to use
the words "allegedly obscene" but later described the seized books as
"allegedly" or "reportedly" obscene. After his arrest Rosenbloom in-
stituted a suit in federal district court claiming that the materials seized
were not obscene and asking for an injunction restraining the local au-
thorities from interfering with his newsstand business. The radio sta-
tion also reported this latter development, forgoing mention of Rosen-
bloom's name, but referring to the initiators of the suit as "girlie book
peddlers" and the materials as "smut or filth."'224 Following Rosen-
bloom's acquittal on the charge of selling obscene literature, he filed a
second action in district court against the radio station seeking damages
for libel. The trial court found for the plaintiff, but the court of appeal
reversed, holding that Rosenbloom had failed to prove that the stories
were broadcast with "actual malice. ' 22 5 The Supreme Court affirmed
the court of appeal's decision. 22 6 The reasoning and language of the
Rosenbloom Court emphasize the deficiency of the Briscoe standard:
[T]he vital needs of freedom of the press and freedom of speech
persuade us that allowing private citizens to obtain damage judgments
on the basis of a jury determination that a publisher probably failed to
use reasonable care would not provide -adequate "breathing space" for
these great freedoms. Reasonable care is an "elusive standard" which
"would place on the press the intolerable burden of guessing how a
jury might assess the reasonableness of steps taken by it to verify the
accuracy of every reference to a name, picture or portrait.1
22 7
The Court specifically stated that "[t]he public's primary interest is in
the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and
the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not the participant's
prior anonymity or notoriety. ' 228  The court of appeal had noted that
223. Id. at 50 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
224. Id. at 32-35.
225. Id. at 40.
226. Id. at 57.
227. Id. at 50, quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, at 389.
228. Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
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"the fact that plaintiff was not a public figure cannot be accorded de-
cisive importance if the recognized important guarantees of the First
Amendment are to be adequately implemented."22  In other words,
the Court was seemingly unconcerned with the status or personage of
the plaintiff. The primary consideration was the newsworthiness of the
subject matter, i.e., the content. Thus, Briscoe's status as a private per-
son and rehabilitated felon would carry little weight with the Court if it
felt that criminal records were within the public domain "per se" and
of sufficient public or general interest to make them available for public
comment.
Though these past and recent Supreme Court decisions did not spe-
cifically concern a "recklessness" standard, but rather "negligence" or
"reasonable care," neither did the cases involve a strict privacy situa-
tion. The United States Supreme Court's rejection of a negligence or
reasonable care standard where the issue was the truthfulness of the
facts reported was founded upon the belief that the press should not be
required to guess what a jury would consider as a proper publication.
The press must be able to objectively protect itself from allegations of
recklessness. Without the availability of objective proof, the press can
never be certain of the propriety of its publication and will forever be
subject to the whims of a jury's determination of the subjective motives
of the publisher.
III. DISCLOSURES WHICH PLACE THE PLAINTIFF
IN A FALSE LIGHT IN THE PU1BLIC EYE
As noted earlier, the Briscoe court stated that a "false light ' 230 cause
of action "' is in substance equivalent to . . . [a] libel claim, and
should meet the same requirements of the libel claim . . . including
proof of malice. . . and fulfillment of the requirements of section 48a
[of the Civil Code] .. . ."231 Section 48a of the California Civil
Code provides that a plaintiff seeking damages for "the publication of
a libel in a newspaper, or of a slander by radio broadcast . . ." may
only recover special damages232 "unless a correction be demanded and
229, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892, 896 (3d Cir. 1969).
230. "False light" is a form of invasion of privacy. Generally it consists of a dis-
closure, not necessarily defamatory, which places the plaintiff in a "false light before
the public eye." PROSSER, supra note 31, at 812-14.
231. 4 Cal. 3d at 543, 483 P.2d at 44, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 876 (citations and foot-
notes omitted), quoting Kapellas, 1 Cal. 3d at 35 n.16, 459 P.2d at 921 n.16,
81 Cal. Rptr. at 369 n.16 (1969).
232. CAL. Civ. CODE § 48a(1) (West 1970) (emphasis supplied).
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be not published or broadcast . . ." in the manner provided by the
Code.233
In Werner v. Southern California Associated Newspapers,234 the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court held that the protection afforded by section 48a
could be constitutionally limited to newspapers and radio broadcast-
ers. 2 5 This limitation was considered justifiable by the fact that these
media are engaged in the immediate dissemination of news, unable to
always verify the accuracy of their stories, and that such enterprises
are particularly well situated to publish effective retractions. 236  In
Morris v. National Federation of the Blind,23 7 a California court of
appeal was directly confronted with section 48a's applicability to mag-
azines. No special damages were alleged and the defendant contended
that since no demand for retraction was made, no general damages
could be recovered.2 3 8  Recognizing that no California decision had
specifically determined the provision's applicability to magazines,23 9 the
court, relying on Werner, found the legislative purpose of section 48a
to be the protection of those who disseminate "'news while it is
new.' "240 These immediate disseminators of news have unique time
limitations and consequently require special protection. It was further
noted that the "exculpatory effect of a retraction is limited to one pub-
lished within three weeks of demand therefor, a requirement which
would often be impossible of fulfillment by a magazine published
monthly."241  Thus, unlike Briscoe, the court declined to extend the
"Special damages" are all damages which plaintiff alleges and proves that he has
suffered in respect to his property, business, trade, profession or occupation, in-
cluding such amounts of money as the plaintiff alleges and proves he has ex-
pended as a result of the alleged libel, and no other. . . . Id. § 48a(4) (b).
233. Id. § 48a(1).
234. 35 Cal. 2d 121, 216 P.2d 825 (1950).
235. Id. at 125-33, 216 P.2d at 827-33. A television (visual radio) broadcast is
included within the meaning of the term "radio broadcast" as used in section 48a.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 48.5(4) (West 1970).
236. 35 Cal. 2d at 125-33, 216 P.2d at 827-33; accord Field Research Corp. v.
Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 110, 113-14, 453 P.2d 747, 750-51, 77 Cal. Rptr. 243,
246-47 (1969).
237. 192 Cal. App. 2d 162, 13 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1961).
238. Id. at 165, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
239. Id. While in Harris v. Curtis Publishing Co., 49 Cal. App. 2d 340, 353-54,
121 P.2d 761, 768-69 (1942), the court assumed section 48a applies to magazines, it
did not discuss the point. Another decision, Shumate v. Johnson Publishing Co.,
139 Cal. App. 2d 121, 129-30, 293 P.2d 531, 537-38 (1956), implied that the statute
did not extend to magazines.
240. 192 Cal. App. 2d at 165, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
241. Id. at 165-66, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
If a correction be demanded within said period [within 20 days after knowledge
of the publication or broadcast] and be not published or broadcast in substantially
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application of section 48a beyond its literal terms.
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The very recent case of Ryffel v. Press Arts, Inc.243 effectively illus-
trates one problem raised by extending application of section 48a to
magazines. In Ryffel, four plaintiffs, members of a rock and roll
group, brought suit charging, inter alia, that the defendant's magazine
placed them in a false light in the public eye when a "publicity photo-
graph" of the plaintiffs was published in an allegedly obscene magazine
called The Rebel Breed.144  Since the plaintiffs never demanded a
retraction pursuant to section 48a, and had stipulated that they would
not seek special damages,245 the defendant moved for summary judg-
ment on the ground that no relief could be granted. 240  The trial court
granted the defendant's motion because (1) no special damages were
available due to the stipulation and (2) no general or punitive damages
were recoverable due to the plaintiffs' lack of compliance with section
48a (citing Briscoe).247  The case belatedly demonstrates the wisdom
of excluding magazines from the operation of section 48a, since the
magazine in which the photograph appeared was a "one time" publica-
as conspicuous a manner in said newspaper or on said broadcasting station as were
the statements claimed to be libelous, in a regular issue thereof published or broad-
cast within three weeks after such service, plaintiff, if he pleads and proves such
notice, demand and failure to correct, and if his cause of action be maintained,
may recover general, special and exemplary damages. . . . CAL. Civ. CoDE
§ 48a(2) (West 1970) (emphasis added).
242. 192 Cal. App. 2d at 166, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 338-39.
Briscoe is not the first California decision to transgress the literality of section 48a.
Despite its express limitation to newspaper libel and radio slander, section 48a was held
applicable to a false light privacy action in Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 193 Cal.
App. 2d 111, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1961). Even if it is assumed that false light is
equivalent to defamation since the harm is primarily a loss of reputation, such an ex-
tension is unwarranted as a matter of statutory construction. See 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv.
862 (1962). However, there is another more fundamental reason for contending that
retraction statutes should be inapplicable to false light privacy actions in general.
The underlying rationale for a retraction provision is that "[w]here the injury is to
reputation, the important consideration is . . . that the cure for injury due to speech
should not be abridgment of that speech but rather 'more speech."' Nimmer, supra
note 78, at 961. But an untrue disclosure of an embarrassing private fact may con-
stitute an invasion of privacy without injuring the subject's reputation. Id. at 963.
In the absence of a reputational injury, "when publication invades privacy the injury
arises from the mere fact of publication, and further speech cannot remedy the injury."
Id. at 961. In Briscoe, however, this second argument was not available, since the
"false light" caused by the defendant's publication was allegedly the implication that
the crime was of recent vintage. Hence, the nature of Briscoe's alleged injury is
clearly the destruction of his reputation as a reformed law-abiding citizen.
243. No. C-943197 (L.A. Super. Ct., filed Nov. 18, 1968).
244. Id. The magazine was printed only for the month of August, 1968.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. The case was dismissed, on this basis, on December 8, 1971.
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tion: even if the plaintiffs had requested a retraction, the magazine
could not have supplied it.
IV. CONCLUSION
There are many facets of Briscoe which in effect contract the permis-
sible scope of news dissemination and at the same time expand the
category of truthful disclosures which can constitute an unwarranted
invasion of privacy. This alone would not make the decision generally
significant to privacy law if it were possible to limit Briscoe to its par-
ticular facts. But there is no apparent reason why the analysis of this
court should be so restricted. The only factor which could cause
hesitation in applying the court's reasoning in other privacy contexts is
that of "rehabilitation." However, the rehabilitation concept need not
be limited to the former criminal who has allegedly rejoined society.
The rehabilitated plaintiff in a privacy action could analogously be a
once public figure who has since intentionally sought and successfully
assumed a life of privacy. Society may have an interest in protecting
such self-indulged reformation. Thus for privacy law in general Bris-
coe may be cited for five basic propositions:
First. The express application of the Meikeljohn theory to truthful
disclosures of "private" facts lessens the scope of published matter ab-
solutely protected by the First Amendment compared to the vague
newsworthiness standard of past privacy decisions. Whether this the-
ory is thought of as recognizing two classes of newsworthy information
differing only in their degree of constitutional protection or as merely
defining newsworthiness in terms of the "public's right to know" is of
no moment. The relative ease in application of this theory will certainly
invite its increased use, with Briscoe appearing as primary authority.
Second. The implied rejection of the public record doctrine also
radically expands the class of disclosures which may constitute an inva-
sion of privacy. Instead of the blind application of the "once public
always public" fiction, Briscoe calls for a more realistic approach to the
private versus public fact question. The test is not what the public has
the power to know but rather what the public has a right to know as
defined by Meikeljohn.
Third. Due to the rejection of the public record doctrine and given
the flexible concept of rehabilitation mentioned above, the mere lapse
of time between the public event and its disclosure takes on new im-
portance in privacy law. The uneventful lapse of time would now ap-
pear to be of almost controlling significance in determining whether
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the plaintiff is "rehabilitated," absent any evidence to the contrary.
Lapse of time should also have important evidentiary significance to a
jury called upon to determine the offensive character of the disclosure,
as well as the recklessness of the defendant charged with responsibility
for its publication. And, for the judge, the greater the lapse of time,
the less likely the disclosure would fall within the realm of the "public's
right to know."
Fourth. Notwithstanding the fact that the manner and context of
the disclosure is in no way lurid, indecent or sensationalized, as those
words are commonly understood, Briscoe makes it clear that a jury
could still find that the mere fact of disclosure was highly offensive to
a reasonable man in the plaintiff's situation. With this new definition
of "offensiveness" one is hard pressed to imagine a truthful disclosure
of a truly private fact which would not be offensive to a plaintiff who
has sought to stay out of the public eye.
Fifth. If the published fact was truly a private fact not within the
public's right to know, then the mere fact of publication itself might be
sufficient to show the defendant's recklessness. His only available de-
fense appears to be either a good faith belief in the public nature of
the fact or a belief that the public has a right to know that which was
published. But recklessness is an objective standard, to be measured
against the standard of the reasonable man. Hence, the subjective
state of mind of the defendant at the time of publication is irrelevant
to the characterization of his conduct.
Robert A. Brunette
